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NICHOLAS O. STEPHANOPOULOS

THE ANTI-CAROLENE COURT

[L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation [should
be] subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny. . . .1
[T]he fact that [partisan] gerrymandering is incompatible with democratic principles does not mean that the solution lies with the federal
judiciary.2

Once upon a time, roughly in the middle of the twentieth century,
Carolene Products’s famous footnote captured much of the Supreme
Court’s constitutional decision making.3 Carolene4 included three key
prescriptions. First, the Court should not strike down ordinary social
and economic legislation: the sorts of laws the Court had routinely
nulliﬁed in the preceding Lochner era.5 Second, the Court should block
efforts by incumbent politicians to distort the political process in
their favor. These efforts are a democratic malfunction—a breach of

Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos is Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Author’s note: I’m grateful to Justin Driver and Rick Pildes for their invaluable comments.
My thanks also to the workshop participants at Loyola University Chicago and the University
of Chicago, where I presented earlier versions of the article.
1
United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).
2

Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2506 (2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

3

See Carolene, 304 US at 152 n 4; see also John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory
of Judicial Review (Harvard, 1980) (making this argument at length).
4

I usually call the case Carolene, rather than Carolene Products, for the sake of brevity.

5

See Carolene, 304 US at 152 (“[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is [generally] not to be pronounced unconstitutional. . . .”).
q 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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the majoritarian ideal—that the Court is well positioned to resolve.6
And third, the Court should also intervene when a minority group
is consistently the loser of political battles. There’s no majoritarian
problem in this scenario, but there is a violation of a different democratic value: pluralism, the idea that groups should endlessly make
and break alliances as they compete over public policy, and no group
should ﬁnd itself perennially outside the winning coalition.7
It’s evident that the contemporary Court no longer heeds Carolene’s ﬁrst directive. A Court that prevents states from restricting the
possession of ﬁrearms,8 or that forbids Congress from mandating the
purchase of health insurance under the Commerce Clause,9 isn’t a
Court that’s willing to defer to most social and economic legislation.
It’s equally plain that Carolene’s third pillar has crumbled. If it still
stood, the Court would celebrate (or at least tolerate) laws that beneﬁt
politically weak minority groups, like afﬁrmative action and school
integration. But the Court subjects these policies to the strictest scrutiny and usually invalidates them,10 even though it’s implausible that
America’s white majority is the victim of a pluralist failure.
Some observers had thought, however, that the second leg of
Carolene’s tripod was still sound: that the Court would still stop politicians from entrenching themselves in ofﬁce through electoral
machinations. Michael Klarman wrote in 1991 that the majoritarian
“prong of political process theory has emerged relatively unscathed
from the barbs of [its] critics.”11 A decade later, Michael Dorf and
Samuel Issacharoff stated that “most have assumed that correcting
[majoritarian] defects is a legitimate judicial function.”12 And at his
6
See id at 152 n 4 (suggesting that “more exacting judicial scrutiny” might apply to “legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation”).
7
See id (indicating that a “more searching judicial inquiry” might apply when “those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities” fail to function properly);
see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 NYU L Rev 1527 (2015) (discussing this Carolene prong in depth).
8
9

See McDonald v City of Chicago, 561 US 742 (2010).
See NFIB v Sebelius, 567 US 519 (2012).

10
See, for example, Fisher v Univ. of Texas, 570 US 297 (2013); Parents Involved v Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 551 US 701 (2007).
11
Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 Va L Rev 747,
748 (1991).
12
Michael C. Dorf and Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U Colo
L Rev 923, 931 (2001).
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2005 conﬁrmation hearing, then-Judge John Roberts described the
special judicial obligation to safeguard the electoral process: “Without access to the ballot box, people are not in the position to protect
any other rights that are important to them.”13
The Court’s recent decision in Rucho v Common Cause14 shows that
the academic commentators were wrong. It also highlights the gulf
between Roberts’s 2005 words and his deeds as Chief Justice. The
Court he now leads—and for which he wrote the majority opinion in
Rucho—is comprehensively anti-Carolene, as hostile to its second directive as to its ﬁrst and third. Rucho involved a partisan gerrymandering challenge to a North Carolina district plan. This plan had been
drawn pursuant to an explicit “Partisan Advantage” criterion that
required “[t]he partisan makeup of [the state’s] congressional delegation” to be “10 Republicans and 3 Democrats.”15 Sure enough, Republican candidates won ten seats, and Democrats three, in both of
the elections held under the plan, even though the state’s voters barely
preferred Republican candidates in the ﬁrst election, and narrowly
favored Democrats in the second.16 The plan’s 10–3 breakdown was
also more pro-Republican than any of the thousands of maps randomly generated by an expert’s computer algorithm.17
It’s hard to imagine a stronger case for judicial intervention under
Carolene’s second prong. North Carolina’s gerrymander deliberately
“restrict[ed] those political processes”—elections—“which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”—by replacing one party’s legislators with the other’s.18 But the
Court declined to step in. And not only did it stay on the sidelines, it
also barred any future Court from entering the ﬁeld, by declaring
partisan gerrymandering categorically nonjusticiable. And not only
that, the Court also mocked the very idea of a judicial responsibility to

13
Joan Biskupic, The Chief: The Life and Turbulent Times of Chief Justice John Roberts 163
(Basic Books, 2019).
14

139 S Ct 2484 (2019).

15

Id at 2510 (Kagan, J, dissenting). A companion case to Rucho involved a Democratic
gerrymander in Maryland.
16
See Brief for Appellees League of Women Voters of North Carolina et al, Rucho v
Common Cause, No 18-422, ∗15 (US ﬁled Mar 31, 2019) (“LWV Brief ”). Due to evidence of
fraud, the Republican victory in one district in 2018 was never certiﬁed and a new election
was called. See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2492.
17

See id at 2518 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

18

United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).
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guard the political process from the ploys of self-interested insiders.
Yes, “gerrymandering is incompatible with democratic principles,”
the Court conceded.19 But, contra Carolene, that “does not mean that
the solution lies with the federal judiciary.”20
I doubt anyone would seriously contest this claim: that Rucho is, at
its core, an anti-Carolene decision. But I want to push the point further. Not only is Rucho an anti-Carolene decision, its reasons for defying Carolene are the same ones that judges and scholars have always
given for resisting Carolene’s logic. Rucho is thus anti-Carolene in both
result and analysis. Consider the Court’s argument that, to strike
down North Carolina’s gerrymander, it would ﬁrst need to determine what a “fair” district map is.21 But “it is not even clear what
fairness looks like in this context,” and “[d]eciding among . . . different visions of fairness . . . poses basic questions that are political,
not legal.”22
The dissenters in the great one-person, one-vote cases of the
1960s objected to the Court’s rulings in exactly these terms. In Baker
v Carr, for example, the 1962 decision that authorized suits about
unequal district population, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that malapportionment couldn’t be condemned unless the Court could say
how districts should be apportioned. “What is actually asked of the
Court . . . is to choose among competing bases of representation—
ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy.”23 Similarly, when John Hart Ely published his seminal defense
of Carolene in 1980,24 the most common academic critique was that
Ely, like Carolene, asked judges to make indeterminate, and inappropriate, decisions among dueling democratic theories. As Jane Schacter
queried, “if political philosophers can agree on no singular formulation of democracy, how might we expect judges to do so?”25
Rucho, then, is an anti-Carolene decision from top to bottom. In
some respects, though, it’s only the tip of the Court’s anti-Carolene
spear, a portent of grimmer rulings, from a Caroline perspective, still
19
20

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2506 (quotation marks omitted).
Id.

21

See id at 2500.

22

Id.
369 US 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J, dissenting).

23
24

See Ely, Democracy and Distrust (cited in note 3).

25

Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 Stan L Rev 737, 753 (2004).
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to come. That’s because Rucho only prevented the federal courts from
hearing partisan gerrymandering claims. It didn’t block other institutions, like Congress, state courts, and the people themselves via
voter initiatives, from tackling gerrymandering. To the contrary,
Rucho encouraged these other actors to intercede. “The States . . .
are actively addressing the issue on a number of fronts,” the Court
remarked.26 “Congress” also has “the power to do something about
partisan gerrymandering [through] the Elections Clause.”27
These invitations to other institutions ring hollow, however, given
the Court’s recent jurisprudence. In a 2015 dissent for four Justices
(which would now probably command ﬁve votes), Chief Justice Roberts contended that the only state entity permitted to regulate redistricting is the last state entity that might wish to do so: the state
legislature.28 Taken to its logical endpoint, this position would preclude not just independent commissions adopted through voter initiatives (the subject of the 2015 case) but also state court suits and
maybe even gubernatorial vetoes of gerrymandered maps. Chief Justice Roberts is the author, too, of Shelby County v Holder, the only
Court decision in modern times to nullify a federal voting rights
statute.29 It’s hardly a stretch that the Shelby County Court might look
askance at congressional legislation, say, compelling states to use commissions to craft their district plans.30
Nor is this more aggressive form of opposition to Carolene—not
just refusing to ﬁx democratic malfunctions judicially, but also thwarting nonjudicial actors from dealing with them31—limited to the redistricting context. In a 2013 case, the Court warned that Congress
may “regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote
in them.”32 So “it would raise serious constitutional doubts” if
Congress tried to stop vote-suppressing state policies like felon

26

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2507.

27

Id at 2508.

28

See Ariz. State Leg. v Ariz. Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S Ct 2652, 2677–92
(2015) (Roberts, CJ, dissenting).
29

570 US 529 (2013).

30

See, for example, HR 1, 116th Cong, 1st Sess, §§ 2400–35 (2019).
I refer to decisions that prevent nonjudicial actors from correcting democratic failures as
perverse Carolene decisions—in contrast to reverse Carolene decisions where the Court itself
declines to intervene in the face of democratic malfunctions. See Part I.
31

32

Arizona v Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 US 1, 16 (2013).
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disenfranchisement laws or photo ID requirements for voting.33 The
Roberts Court has also been a relentless foe of campaign ﬁnance
regulations, rejecting one such restriction after another.34 But limits
on electoral funding are usually passed after scandals by reformist
coalitions—not by insiders guarding their privileged perches. Empirically, too, these measures boost competition (and challengers) because their bite is felt more acutely by incumbents.35
If the Roberts Court isn’t a Carolene Court, though, what exactly is
it? Judicial restraint—avoiding the “expansion of judicial authority”
into “American political life,” in Rucho’s words36—can’t explain the
Court’s election law cases. Rucho might plausibly be seen as a restrained decision, but the Court’s campaign ﬁnance rulings, systematically deregulating the funding of elections, can’t possibly ﬁt that
mold. Nor is originalism a satisfying answer. Notably, North Carolina’s sole unsuccessful argument in Rucho was that “the Framers set
aside electoral issues such as [partisan gerrymandering] as questions
that only Congress can resolve.”37 Nor does concern for individual liberty weave together the various doctrinal strands. Free speech
claims prevailed in the Court’s campaign ﬁnance cases, of course. But
they failed in Rucho, dismissed in a few cursory paragraphs.38 And the
franchise is a freedom, too, yet the Roberts Court has never found a
violation of it.
This leaves more and less sympathetic accounts. More charitably,
the Roberts Court might think that American democracy functions
reasonably well, at present, except when the elected branches restrict
the ﬁnancing of campaigns. On this view, contemporary politicians
pose no serious threat to the right to vote—certainly not compared to
past abuses—but do often endanger the liberty of electoral donors
and spenders. More cynically, the Roberts Court may be as aware as
any other observer of the pathologies of modern American democracy: gerrymandering, voter suppression, the enormous inﬂuence of
the wealthy, and so on. But a majority of the Justices may realize,
33
34

Id at 17.
See, for example, Citizens United v FEC, 558 US 310 (2010).

35
See, for example, Thomas Stratmann, How Close Is Fundraising in Contested Elections in
States with Low Contribution Limits? 9 (May 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/RC4Z-3Z7N.
36
Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2507 (2019).
37

Id at 2495.

38

See id at 2504–05.
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consciously or not, that these pathologies redound largely to their
ideological beneﬁt. Flipping Carolene on its head, they may then intervene in the political process, or refrain from acting, in a pattern
that perpetuates the pathologies.
The article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I identify the ways in
which Court decisions may relate to Carolene. They may follow its
logic correctly or mistakenly, or they may spurn its prescriptions for
courts or for all institutions. Next, in Part II, I analyze Rucho through
Carolene’s lens. Rucho is a classic anti-Carolene decision in both its
holding and its reasoning. But its rationales are far from unassailable,
as demonstrated by Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent. In Part III, I then
look beyond Rucho to other election law contexts. Throughout the
ﬁeld, the Court may soon converge on a maximally anti-Carolene
stance: barring all institutions, not just federal courts, from correcting
democratic failures. Lastly, in Part IV, I try to divine what’s driving
the Roberts Court in this area, since it’s plainly not Carolene. The
more benign possibilities seem inapt, raising the likelihood of more
unsettling options.
I. Carolene Categories
It’s hard to overstate the centrality of Carolene in modern constitutional law.39 For decades, Carolene’s ﬁrst directive—that “legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is [generally] not to
be pronounced unconstitutional”—explained the Court’s deference
to the elected branches in most cases.40 It also highlighted the cardinal sin of the earlier Lochner era: the Court’s substitution of its own
substantive values for those of the people’s elected representatives.
Carolene’s second insight, in turn, eventually launched the ﬁeld of

39
See, for example, Schuette v Coalition to Defend Afﬁrmative Action, 572 US 291, 368 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J, dissenting) (“The values identiﬁed in Carolene Products . . . are central tenets of
our equal protection jurisprudence.”); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82
Colum L Rev 1087, 1088 (1982) (noting that Carolene “commenced a new era in constitutional law”).
40
United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 (1938). Note that I’m bracketing,
for present purposes, the ﬁrst paragraph of Carolene’s famous footnote calling for heightened
judicial review “when legislation appears on its face to be within a speciﬁc prohibition of the
Constitution.” Id at 152 n 4. This is a textual rather than a democratic rationale for judicial
intervention, and so represents “an idea quite foreign” to the rest of the footnote, in the words of
the law clerk who originally drafted it. Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence,
82 Colum L Rev 1093, 1097 (1982).
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election law.41 The discipline’s foundational mission was identifying
“legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”:
laws against which judicial intervention is arguably warranted.42 And
Carolene’s third pillar justiﬁed the Court’s vigilance, at least for a time,
against measures targeting African Americans and other vulnerable
groups. “[T]hose political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities,” Carolene recognized, don’t always function
properly without judicial oversight.43
I only want to say a word here about Carolene’s ﬁrst and third
prongs, which is that the contemporary Court often honors them in
the breach. The ﬁrst prong holds that the Court should rarely invalidate acts of Congress, most of which are garden-variety social or
economic legislation. But the Rehnquist Court struck down about
two-ﬁfths of the congressional statutes it considered, and the Roberts
Court has nulliﬁed almost three-ﬁfths. By comparison, the Vinson,
Warren, and Burger Courts found unconstitutional only a quarter of
the congressional laws they reviewed.44 Likewise, Carolene’s third
prong instructs the Court to be receptive to claims brought by politically weak minorities. But the Court has ruled in favor of just one
African American plaintiff mounting an equal protection challenge
in recent decades.45 In contrast, myriad white litigants have prevailed
in their equal protection suits—against afﬁrmative action plans,46
41
See generally Luke P. McLoughlin, The Elysian Foundations of Election Law, 82 Temple L
Rev 89 (2009).
42
Carolene, 304 US at 152 n 4.
43
Id; see also Stephanopoulos, 90 NYU L Rev 1527 (cited in note 7) (discussing in detail
this Carolene prong).
44
I calculated these fractions using Keith Whittington’s illuminating dataset of Supreme
Court cases involving constitutional challenges to acts of Congress. See Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Database (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/KF7P-J8NC; see
also Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo L J
491, 547 (1997) (concurring that the Court has “burst asunder the restrictions imposed on
judicial review by political process theory”).
45
See Johnson v California, 543 US 499 (2005) (requiring strict scrutiny to be applied to an
informal prison policy of racially segregating inmates during their initial evaluation). African
American plaintiffs have also succeeded in recent racial gerrymandering cases, starting with
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v Alabama, 135 S Ct 1257 (2015), but the litigants’ race was
irrelevant to (and sometimes not even noted by) the Court’s analysis.
46
See, for example, Fisher v Univ. of Texas, 570 US 297 (2013). But see Fisher v Univ. of
Texas, 136 S Ct 2198 (2016) (ultimately upholding the University of Texas’s afﬁrmative
action program and thus demonstrating that afﬁrmative action isn’t (yet) categorically unconstitutional). Numerous successful challenges to afﬁrmative-action plans also predate the
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school integration programs,47 districts electing minority candidates,48
and the like. From a Carolene perspective, all these litigants should have
lost, being members of a group that can hardly be said to be powerless.49
Turning to Carolene’s second prong—my focus in this article—its
gist is reasonably clear. Usually, American democracy performs adequately. Usually, that is, “political processes” like free speech, free
association, the franchise, and a properly structured electoral system
“bring about [the] repeal of undesirable legislation” (or the enactment of desired policy).50 Sometimes, though, self-interested politicians pass “legislation which restricts those political processes.”51 Sometimes, in Ely’s indelible words, “the ins are choking off the channels
of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will
stay out.”52 When this scenario arises, it’s the Court’s duty to intervene: to break up the blockage that’s responsible for the democratic
malfunction. Through its intercession, the Court doesn’t frustrate
but rather vindicates the popular sovereignty that’s the core of the
American constitutional order—by enabling the people (not the
politicians) to be sovereign.
It’s true that this account of Carolene’s second prong papers over
some tricky conceptual issues. In particular, when do “political processes,” in fact, “bring about [the] repeal of undesirable legislation”?53
Just so long as everyone can freely speak, associate, and cast a ballot?
Ely seemed to think so at times, labeling his elaboration of Carolene
a “participation-oriented . . . approach to judicial review.”54 Or are
“political processes” a synonym for majoritarian democracy—the
idea that the will of a popular majority should generally control? This

Roberts Court, of course. See, for example, City of Richmond v J. A. Croson Co., 488 US 469
(1989).
47

See, for example, Parents Involved v Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 US 701 (2007).

48

See, for example, Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993).
See, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 Harv L Rev 1, 7 (2013)
(agreeing that “courts enforcing equal protection claims have come to intervene in the decisions of representative government to protect members of majority groups in ways they
scarcely ever intervene to protect members of minority groups,” thus “turn[ing] the reasoning of
Carolene Products on its head”).
49

50

United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).

51

Id.
Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 103 (cited in note 3).

52
53

Carolene, 304 US at 152 n 4.

54

Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 87 (cited in note 3).
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is probably the most common view of Carolene,55 and Ely expressed it,
too, at other times.56 Or is responsiveness to (rather than congruence
with) public opinion the crux of Carolene’s “political processes”? This
position, held by scholars like Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes,
stresses that as voters change their minds, public policy should shift
accordingly.57
I don’t try to resolve this debate here. (I also don’t think resolution
is possible. Carolene’s second prong simply doesn’t specify the precise
form of democracy the Court had in mind.) But I do want to insist
that Carolene’s “political processes” must encompass more than just
unrestricted speaking, associating, and voting. This is because free
participation, important as it is, doesn’t necessarily “bring about [the]
repeal of undesirable legislation.” Say that citizens may participate as
they please. But say that self-interested politicians get to choose how
votes are aggregated: how votes, in other words, translate into legislative seats. Then there’s no guarantee that unwanted policies will
actually be reversed. It’s perfectly possible that they’ll remain in effect,
shielded from the will of the electorate by a legislature that, thanks to
the method of vote aggregation, fails to reﬂect public opinion.58
To put the point another way, Carolene’s “repeal of undesirable
legislation” is a reference to policy outcomes. A purely participational
theory of democracy is silent about policy outcomes. It only stipulates
that citizens should be able to speak, associate, and vote without
restraint. It therefore can’t be Carolene’s theory even if we remain
unsure which democratic model that does incorporate the outputs of

55
See, for example, Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 Yale L J 1287, 1293 (1982) (“[P]aragraph two of the footnote captures . . . the
lesson of twentieth century perversions of the majoritarian forms of politics.”); Owen M. Fiss,
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv L Rev 1, 6 (1979) (noting Carolene’s “general presumption in favor of majoritarianism”). I’m also partial to a majoritarian theory of democracy,
aiming above all for governmental outputs aligned with the preferences of the median voter.
See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 Colum L Rev 283
(2014).
56
See, for example, Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 7 (cited in note 3) (“[M]ajoritarian
democracy is . . . the core of our entire system. . . .”).
57
See, for example, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan L Rev 643, 646 (1998) (asserting that “one of the
central goals of democratic politics” is “that the policy outcomes of the political process be
responsive to the interests and views of citizens”).
58
Election law has long recognized this point. See, for example, Pamela S. Karlan, The
Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 Tex L Rev 1705, 1707–08 (1993) (noting
that voting implicates people’s interests in participation, aggregation, and governance).
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the political process—majoritarianism, responsiveness, or some other
approach—is Carolene’s theory.
So understood, how may Carolene’s second prong relate to Court
rulings? First, a correct Carolene decision accurately perceives a democratic defect: a practice that prevents certain people from engaging
in politics or that distorts the translation of voter sentiment into
representation. A correct Carolene decision also holds the practice
unconstitutional, thereby furthering key democratic values.59 In the
Court’s jurisprudence, the one-person, one-vote cases of the 1960s
are probably the most famous examples of correct Carolene decisions.60 Malapportionment on a massive scale had led to a “rural
strangle hold” on the legislature in many states: a glaring democratic
defect.61 By requiring equally populated districts, the Court repaired
the democratic damage, “releasing the strangle hold on the legislature” and ending the “frustration of the majority will.”62
Second, a mistaken Carolene decision tries to heed Carolene’s logic
but misdiagnoses the policy at issue. The Court may wrongly think
the policy is benign—consistent with a properly functioning democracy—and so refrain from acting when it should have intervened. Or
the Court may err by ﬁnding the policy democratically destructive,
though in fact it’s neutral or even helpful, and then invalidating a law it
should have sustained.63 I argue below that the Roberts Court’s campaign ﬁnance cases are mistaken Carolene decisions. They assert that
regulations of electoral funding are efforts by incumbents to squash
competition. But these claims are incorrect; most campaign ﬁnance
laws actually assist challengers. A Carolene Court should therefore have
upheld these pro-competitive measures.64

59
Alternatively, in the absence of a democratic defect, a correct Carolene decision refrains
from intervention. This is the scenario covered by Carolene’s ﬁrst prong.
60
See, for example, Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv L Rev 28, 44 (2004) (“Malapportionment . . . represents the paradigm instance of
justiﬁed judicial oversight.”); David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U Ill L Rev
1251, 1259 (“Perhaps the most dramatic example[s] of a Carolene Products success story . . . [are]
the so-called reapportionment decisions.”).
61
Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 543 (1964).
62

Id at 543, 576.

Dorf and Issacharoff brieﬂy note the possibility of mistaken Carolene decisions, “ask[ing]
what happens if judges stray from the proper approach,” and adding that “there [is] no
guarantee that they would [apply Carolene] correctly.” Dorf and Issacharoff, 72 U Colo L Rev
at 941 (cited in note 12).
63

64

See Part III.B.
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Third, a reverse Carolene decision does the opposite of what Carolene instructs.65 The Court acknowledges that a practice undermines
democratic values by impeding political participation or skewing the
conversion of voters’ preferences into legislative inﬂuence. But the
Court declines to step in because it rejects Carolene’s basic tenet. It
disagrees that it should exercise its power of judicial review to break
up blockages of the political process. The propriety of judicial intervention is untethered, in its view, from the operation of American
democracy.66 Rucho, I contend in the next Part, is a quintessential reverse Carolene decision. It freely concedes that partisan gerrymandering is undemocratic. But this admission is followed not by the
gerrymander’s dismantling—the next step under Carolene—but by its
insulation from any further challenge in the federal courts.67
Lastly, a perverse Carolene decision heightens the Court’s deﬁance
of Carolene by another notch.68 The Court sees other actors—Congress, state courts, ordinary people through voter initiatives—taking
steps to ﬁx democratic malfunctions. But the Court doesn’t cheer
these remedies as appealing alternatives to the judicial intervention
it’s unwilling to undertake. Instead, the Court stops the other actors’
projects dead in their tracks, holding that they’re barred by the federal Constitution. The Court thus prevents any entity from engaging
in pro-democratic policymaking. It invokes its power of judicial review not to promote democracy but to ensure its continued subversion. Perverse Carolene decisions, I maintain below, have already begun to mar the Court’s doctrine. And they may become even more
common in the years ahead, particularly when the Court next considers
the validity of redistricting commissions. These bodies are the primary nonjudicial response to gerrymandering. But the Court may well
hold that they violate the Elections Clause or the First Amendment.69
65
For another scholar using similar terminology in a helpful contribution, see Aaron Tang,
Reverse Political Process Theory, 70 Vand L Rev 1427 (2017). Tang calls it reverse political
process theory when the Court “afford[s] special protections . . . to politically powerful
entities that are able to advance their interests full well in the democratic arena.” Id at 1430–
31. As the next paragraph explains, I refer to such rulings as perverse Carolene decisions, frustrating the efforts of nonjudicial actors to pursue democratic goals.
66
Alternatively, a reverse Carolene decision invalidates a policy that’s democratically unproblematic. But this scenario is better understood as a violation of Carolene’s ﬁrst prong.
67
See Part II.
68
I previously discussed perverse Carolene decisions (without employing that nomenclature) in Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Arizona and Anti-Reform, 2015 U Chi Legal F 477,
487–91.
69

See Part III.
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Of course, this taxonomy of Court decisions is incomplete. It
doesn’t even try to incorporate most of the factors that drive judicial
decision making: text, structure, history, precedent, and so on.70 The
taxonomy is thus best understood as the product of a thought experiment. If Carolene’s second prong—the proposition that judicial
review should be pro-democratic—were its own modality of constitutional interpretation, then how could that modality be applied?
How, that is, could the Court follow or ﬂout Carolene’s command?
II. A Reverse Carolene Decision
One way the Court could ﬂout the command is by issuing a
ruling like Rucho. Rucho, I argue in this Part, is an archetypal reverse
Carolene decision—a distillation of the genre to its purest form. The
Court grants that partisan gerrymandering is undemocratic, yet
bars federal courts from lifting a ﬁnger to stop it. I also situate Rucho
within the corpus of anti-Carolene jurisprudence and scholarship. To
an uncanny degree, the case echoes the positions of the one-person,
one-vote dissenters of the 1960s and of the critics of Ely’s political
process theory. Those views, moreover, are far from irrebuttable. In
her dissent in Rucho, in fact, Justice Kagan picks them apart, showing
that while Carolene no longer animates a Court majority, its message
still endures.
a. carolene’s spurned logic
The claim that partisan gerrymandering offends the democratic
values that Carolene seeks to protect is uncontroversial. As I show
below, even the Rucho Court agrees with that assessment (though not
with what, under Carolene, courts should do about it). Nevertheless,
it’s useful to explain why, exactly, gerrymandering is undemocratic:
both the North Carolina plan at issue in Rucho and the practice more
generally. In a nutshell, gerrymandering awards the line-drawing
party more seats than it would have earned under a neutral map. In a
polarized era, these extra seats shift the ideological center of the
legislature and, with it, the laws the legislature passes. Both legislative
representation and enacted policy are thus skewed in the direction of
the line-drawing party—and away from what voters actually want.71

70

Cf. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford, 1984).

71

For a similar argument, see Stephanopoulos, 2015 U Chi Legal F at 489 (cited in note 68).
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To phrase the point in terms of Carolene’s democratic values,72
gerrymandering can lead to countermajoritarian outcomes. Sometimes the electorate prefers one party’s candidates but, thanks to
cleverly drawn districts, it gets a legislature run by the other party and
advancing that party’s agenda. Gerrymandering can also stiﬂe electoral responsiveness. Modern map makers typically make their side’s
seats reasonably safe: closer to 60 percent of the vote (and a comfortable twenty-point margin) than 50 percent plus one.73 Seats of
this sort don’t ﬂip in all but the most extreme electoral environments,
rendering futile even signiﬁcant changes in voter sentiment. And
gerrymandering can inhibit political participation, too. It doesn’t directly prevent anyone from speaking, associating, or voting. But it
deters some citizens from engaging in these activities since they realize,
no matter how hard they try, their efforts will likely be in vain.
To make this discussion more concrete, consider the North Carolina plan in Rucho. Its architects weren’t shy about their goal of
guaranteeing ten seats for Republican candidates and three for Democrats—whether or not voters wanted so lopsided a congressional
delegation. A legislative committee ratiﬁed a criterion explicitly labeled “Partisan Advantage,” providing that “[t]he partisan makeup
of the congressional plan” would be “10 Republicans and 3 Democrats.”74 The cochair of this committee added, in breathtakingly candid testimony, “I propose that we draw the maps to give a partisan
advantage to 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats because I do not believe
it’s possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.”75
The plan’s results realized its drafters’ ambitions. In both of the
elections in which it was used, ten Republican candidates and three
72
Again, I don’t try to choose among these values here, at least not beyond insisting that
participation isn’t the only relevant value.
73
See, for example, Common Cause v Rucho, 279 F Supp 3d 587, 657–58 (MDNC 2018),
rev’d, 139 S Ct 2484 (2019) (observing that “all ten Republican districts” in the North
Carolina plan at issue in Rucho were “‘safe,’” that is, “highly unlikely to change parties in
subsequent elections”).
74

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2510 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
Id; see also id (quoting the cochair’s comment that “I think electing Republicans is better
than electing Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the
country.”). In Rucho’s wake, such brazen partisan boasts are likely to become more common,
as are even more aggressive gerrymandering techniques like drawing noncontiguous districts,
redistricting more frequently than once per decade, and using computer algorithms to design
more durably skewed maps. See Aaron Goldzimer and Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Democrats
Can’t Be Afraid to Gerrymander Now, Slate ( July 3, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/GQ96
-2UVX.
75
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Democrats won seats.76 This breakdown held even though the second
election—the Democratic wave of 2018—saw Democrats earn a
majority of the statewide vote.77 That election thus yielded both a
countermajoritarian outcome and no responsiveness at all to the
electorate’s pro-Democratic swing. More sophisticated metrics tell
the same story. According to one expert, the North Carolina plan was
the single most biased congressional map of the last half-century.78
That expert also found that it would take a pro-Democratic wave on
par with the Watergate election of 1974 for the plan’s bias to dissipate.79 Another expert randomly generated thousands of North
Carolina congressional maps based on all of the drafters’ nonpartisan
criteria. Not one of them was as tilted in Republicans’ favor as the
actual plan.80
But perhaps these statistics don’t reveal a real democratic problem.
Perhaps legislative representation and enacted policy still reﬂect
voter opinion, when a map is gerrymandered, even if seat tallies are
out of whack. Recent empirical research puts this rosy view to rest.
When a state legislative81 or congressional82 plan is biased toward a
party, the ideological midpoint of the chamber or delegation shifts
signiﬁcantly in that party’s preferred direction. So, too, do the measures that become law. In fact, “a one standard deviation change in [a
plan’s bias] has a larger impact on state policy than a change in the
party of the governor.”83 The effects of gerrymandering thus aren’t
limited to the seat and vote percentages that preoccupy election
wonks. They extend, rather, to the ideological composition and policy
output of the legislature—the very essence of democratic governance.
Indeed, they extend even further than that. Plaintiffs in several
recent cases have testiﬁed that gerrymandering chills their political

76
See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2491–92; see also id (noting that one of the Republican victories in
2018 was tainted by fraud).
77

See LWV Brief at ∗15 (cited in note 16).

78

See id at ∗16–17; see also Common Cause, 279 F Supp 3d at 659–60.
See Common Cause, 279 F Supp 3d at 660–61.

79
80

See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2518 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

81

See Devin Caughey et al, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Political Process: Effects on RollCall Voting and State Policies, 16 Election L J 453, 462–64 (2017).
82
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering, 59 Wm
& Mary L Rev 2115, 2140–43 (2018).
83

See Caughey et al, 16 Election L J at 464–66 (cited in note 81).
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participation, discouraging them from speaking, associating, and voting in races whose results are foreordained. As one litigant in Rucho
remarked, “I can’t tell you how many people told me this election . . .
‘This system is rigged. My vote doesn’t count.’ It was really hard to
try to galvanize people to participate.”84 These anecdotes ﬁnd support in new academic work. When a party is disadvantaged by a district plan, at either the state legislative or congressional level, its adherents suffer a host of participational harms. They become less likely
to run for ofﬁce; candidates who do choose to run have worse credentials; donors don’t give as much money; and voters are less apt to
turn out.85 “Prevented [by gerrymandering] from attaining their
electoral or policy objectives, elites and voters alike . . . perform their
[various] functions with less enthusiasm.”86
Unsurprisingly,87 the Rucho Court didn’t cite this (or any other)
study. But it did repeatedly acknowledge that gerrymandering is undemocratic. (As Justice Kagan quipped in dissent, “really, how could
it not?”88) “Excessive partisanship in districting,” the Court observed,
“leads to results that reasonably seem unjust.”89 “[G]errymandering is
‘incompatible with democratic principles,’” the Court continued.90
In fact, “partisan gerrymanders violate the core principle of [our]
republican government . . . namely, that the voters should choose
their representatives, not the other way around.”91 That’s why the

84
Common Cause, 279 F Supp 3d at 679; see also, for example, Benisek v Lamone, 348 F Supp
3d 493, 523 (D Md 2018), rev’d, 139 S Ct 2484 (2019) (“[T]estimony provided by several of
the plaintiffs revealed a lack of enthusiasm, indifference to voting, a sense of disenfranchisement, a sense of disconnection, and confusion after the 2011 redistricting . . .”).
85
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and Christopher Warshaw, The Impact of Partisan
Gerrymandering on Political Parties 13–21 (Aug 21, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/8KLL
-S8XZ.
86

Id at 4.
Unsurprisingly, because Chief Justice Roberts, Rucho’s author, is a noted skeptic of empirical research. See, for example, Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill v Whitford, No 16-1161,
∗
40 (Oct 3, 2017) (describing quantitative measures of partisan gerrymandering as “sociological
gobbledygook”).
88
Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2512 (2019) (Kagan, J, dissenting); see also id
(“The majority disputes none of what I have said . . . about how gerrymanders undermine
democracy.”).
89
Id at 2506.
87

90
Id (quoting Ariz. State Leg. v Ariz. Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S Ct 2652, 2658
(2015)).
91

Id (quotation marks omitted).
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Court “does not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering,”92 but
instead describes it, over and over, as a “problem.”93
Under Carolene, the next step of the analysis is painfully obvious.
Gerrymandering is “unjust,” “incompatible with democratic principles,” contrary to “the core principle of our republican government”—so therefore the Court should step in and halt the practice.
In Carolene’s own words, gerrymandering “restricts those political
processes” (legislative elections) “which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” (by ousting unpopular
legislators) and thus warrants “exacting judicial scrutiny.”94 Or as
Jamal Greene recently put it, when a party “constructs district lines
intentionally to maintain its own partisan advantage,” “[i]ts behavior
falls squarely, almost comically, into the second paragraph of Carolene
Products footnote four.”95
And yet the Rucho Court declined to invalidate the North Carolina
plan, announcing instead that partisan gerrymandering claims are
inherently nonjusticiable. In so ruling, the Court pointedly rejected
Carolene’s central claim: that the state of American democracy and the
need for judicial intervention should be linked. “Gerrymandering is
incompatible with democratic principles”—but that “does not mean
that the solution lies with the federal judiciary.”96 “Gerrymanders
violate the core principle of our republican government”—but “[t]hat
seems like an objection more properly grounded in the Guarantee
Clause,” which “does not provide the basis for a justiciable claim.”97
Some argue that “this Court can address the problem of partisan
gerrymandering because it must”—but “[t]hat is not the test of our
authority under the Constitution.”98

92

Id at 2507.

93

Id at 2494, 2496, 2507.
United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).

94

95
Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 Harv L Rev 28, 128 (2018); see also, for
example, Pildes, 118 Harv L Rev at 55 (cited in note 60) (“Partisan gerrymandering is a
paradigmatic instance of the structural pathology all democratic systems face.”); Kathleen M.
Sullivan and Pamela S. Karlan, The Elysian Fields of the Law, 57 Stan L Rev 695, 711 (2004)
(Ely “would have been outraged by the Court’s recent decision” refusing to rein in partisan
gerrymandering).
96
Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2506 (quotation marks omitted).
97

Id (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Id at 2507 (quotation marks omitted). Or as Justice Kagan wrote in her dissent, “In the
face of grievous harm to democratic governance,” and “in the face of escalating partisan
98
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These passages are some of the clearest repudiations of Carolene
ever to appear in the United States Reports.99 The Court almost seems
to ﬂaunt its view that minority rule, electoral nonresponsiveness, and
chilled participation—all the democratic injuries caused by gerrymandering—are irrelevant to the Court’s decision making. Democracy may be burning, but the Court ﬂatly refuses any responsibility for
extinguishing the ﬂames. This position, of course, is the antithesis of
Carolene, which holds that putting out the ﬁre is the Court’s most
critical task. That’s why I refer to Rucho as a paradigmatic reverse
Carolene decision: as close to Carolene’s opposite as we’re ever likely to
see.
b. doctrinal echoes
Rucho, however, does more than just abjure Carolene’s logic. It also
gives reasons for its renunciation: arguments why judicial intervention
should be unconnected to democratic malfunction. I now turn to
these reasons, and contend that they strongly resemble the ones offered by the dissenters in the one-person, one-vote cases of the 1960s.
Reading Rucho, in fact, any student of the Court’s redistricting doctrine is likely to experience a powerful sense of déjà vu. It’s as though
the 1960s dissenters are speaking from the grave, only this time for a
prevailing majority of the Court instead of a defeated minority.100
But why compare Rucho to the reapportionment cases of half a
century ago? For one thing, those cases involved many of the same
subjects as Rucho: redistricting, vote dilution, and the electoral inﬂuence of different groups. Those cases also didn’t involve (at least not

manipulation whose compatibility with this Nation’s values and law no one defends,” “the
majority declines to provide any remedy.” Id at 2515 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
99
As I discuss in the next section, the dissents in the one-person, one-vote cases of the
1960s are the other contenders to the anti-Carolene throne. See, for example, Wesberry v
Sanders, 376 US 1, 48 (1964) (Harlan, J, dissenting) (“The Constitution does not confer on
the Court blanket authority to step into every situation where the political branch may be
thought to have fallen short.”); Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J, dissenting) (asserting that “there is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every
political mischief ”). A striking earlier anti-Carolene decision was Giles v Harris, 189 US 475,
488 (1903), where the Court acquiesced in Alabama’s refusal to register African American
citizens on the ground that “relief from a great political wrong . . . must be given by [the
state] or by the legislative and political department of the [federal] government.”
100
See, for example, Guy-Uriel Charles and Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking About
Law and Democracy in Rucho v. Common Cause, 3 Am Const Soc’y Sup Ct Rev 293, 308 (2019)
(“From an analytical perspective, there is nothing new in Rucho; Chief Justice Roberts basically sings from the standard hymnal.”).
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front and center101) the distinct issue of racial discrimination, the
focus of Carolene’s third prong. Moreover, as noted earlier, those
cases are widely regarded as the best historical examples of correct
Carolene decisions.102 According to Pamela Karlan, “[n]othing provides a better model of anti-entrenchment judicial review than the
Warren Court’s reapportionment cases,” where “the Court confronted . . . textbook examples of the systematic restriction of the
political process.”103 Lastly, those cases were hotly contested, featuring several Justices writing long, sophisticated dissents over a
multiyear period. As a result, the rationales for pro-democratic judicial intervention were matched by rebuttals—thrust met by parry—
in a vigorous debate unsurpassed before or since.
One of the Rucho Court’s reasons for not tackling gerrymandering, then, was its view that neither the Constitution’s text nor its
history supports a judicial role in this area. Certain important modes
of constitutional interpretation, in other words, don’t corroborate
Carolene and may even undercut it. Citing the Elections Clause, the
Court observed that it “assign[ed] the issue [of redistricting] to the
state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.”104 “At no point was there a suggestion that the federal courts
had a role to play” in curbing redistricting abuses.105 The Court also
commented that the constitutional provisions applicable to gerrymandering—the Elections Clause and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments—are too abstract to be helpful. They “provide [ ] no
basis whatever to guide the exercise of judicial discretion.”106 “But we
have no commission to allocate political power and inﬂuence in the
absence of a constitutional directive . . . to guide us in the exercise of
such authority.”107
101
Several of the pivotal one-person, one-vote cases did arise in southern states (like
Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee) where racial discrimination was never far from the surface.
102

See Part I.
Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter,
114 Yale L J 1329, 1333 (2005); see also, for example, Pildes, 118 Harv L Rev at 44 (cited in
note 60); Strauss, 2010 U Ill L Rev at 1259 (cited in note 60).
103

104

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2496.
Id; see also id (“Nor was there any indication that the Framers had ever heard of courts
doing such a thing.”).
105

106
Id at 2506; see also id at 2505 (noting that justiciable claims “typically involve constitutional . . . provisions . . . conﬁning and guiding the exercise of judicial discretion”).
107
Id at 2508; see also id at 2507 (“Federal judges have no license to reallocate political
power between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in the
Constitution. . . .”).
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This argument—call it the conventional modalities point—ran through
the 1960s reapportionment dissents as well. Those opinions stressed
that the Court’s one-person, one-vote rule wasn’t grounded in the
Constitution’s text, structure, or history. Justice John Marshall Harlan II thus wrote in Wesberry v Sanders, the 1964 case that applied the
rule to congressional district plans, that “the language of [Article I],
the surrounding text, and the relevant history are all in strong and
consistent direct contradiction of the Court’s holding.108 In Reynolds v
Sims, the case later in 1964 that extended the equal population principle to state legislative maps, Justice Harlan added that “the Equal
Protection Clause was never intended to inhibit the States in choosing any democratic method they pleased for the apportionment of
their legislatures.”109 “This is shown by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment taken as a whole, by the understanding of those
who proposed and ratiﬁed it, and by the political practices of the
States at the time the Amendment was adopted.”110 Justice Potter
Stewart concurred in a companion case to Reynolds, opining that “[t]he
Court’s draconian pronouncement . . . ﬁnds no support in the words of
the Constitution . . . or in the 175-year political history of our Federal
Union.”111
A second reason the Rucho Court gave for not intervening against
gerrymandering was its uncertainty how to recognize a nongerrymandered plan. “[I]t is not even clear what fairness looks like
in this context,” the Court remarked.112 To some, a normatively attractive map “may mean a greater number of competitive districts.”113
To others, it may mean “ensur[ing] each party its ‘appropriate’ share
of ‘safe’ seats.”114 Still others may think “fairness should be measured
by adherence to ‘traditional’ districting criteria.”115 Faced with these
competing districting goals, the Court threw up its hands. “Deciding
108
109

376 US 1, 41 (1964) (Harlan, J, dissenting).
377 US 533, 590–91 (1964) (Harlan, J, dissenting).

110
Id at 591; see also, for example, id at 614–15 (“[T]oday’s decisions are refuted by the
language of the Amendment which they construe,” as well as “by history and by consistent
theory and practice . . .”).
111
Lucas v Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 US 713, 746 (1964) (Stewart, J,
dissenting).
112
113

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2500.
Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.
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among just these different visions of fairness (you can imagine many
others) poses basic questions that are political, not legal.”116 “There
are no legal standards discernible in the Constitution for making such
judgments. . . .”117
Justice Frankfurter made the same argument about the lack of
normative consensus in Baker v Carr, the 1962 case holding that oneperson, one-vote claims are justiciable.118 “Apportionment, by its
character, is a subject of extraordinary complexity,” he wrote.119 It
raises “fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a representative legislature.”120 It also implicates more
practical “considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or divergences among
particular local groups . . . and a host of others.”121 But “these are not
factors that lend themselves to . . . judicial determinations.”122 To
evaluate them, the Court would have to “choose among competing
bases of representation—ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy.”123 These aren’t matters that “judges are
equipped to adjudicate by legal training or experience or native
wit.”124
Third, the Rucho Court asserted that judges lack the empirical skills
to assess district plans’ electoral effects. The district court had included in its proposed test an element asking if a map’s bias would
likely persist in future elections.125 In response, the Court described
historical cases where “predictions of durability proved to be dramatically wrong” due to “ﬂawed assumptions about voter preferences and behavior.”126 Generalizing its critique, the Court claimed
116
117

Id.
Id.

118

369 US 186 (1962).

119

Id at 323 (Frankfurter, J, dissenting).
Id.

120
121

Id.

122

Id at 324.
Id at 300.

123

124
Id at 324. In Avery v Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), similarly, Justice Harlan
alleged that the Court had embraced “a particular political ideology” even though that view
“has been the subject of wide debate and differences from the beginnings of our Nation.” Id
at 490 (Harlan, J, dissenting).
125

See Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2503 (2019).

126

Id.
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that voters’ choices depend on a host of changeable conditions: “the
quality of the candidates, the tone of the candidates’ campaigns, the
performance of an incumbent, national events or local issues that drive
voter turnout,” and so on.127 Consequently, “asking judges to predict
how a particular districting map will perform in future elections”
would put them “on unstable ground outside judicial expertise.”128
The 1960s dissenters also leveled this judicial capacity objection.
Addressing the one-person, one-vote rule after it was ﬂoated by Justice William Douglas’s concurrence in Baker,129 Justice Frankfurter
labeled it a “mathematical quagmire” of “judicially inappropriate and
elusive determinants,” from which there would be no “means of extrication.”130 “To charge courts with the task of [solving] these mathematical puzzles is to attribute . . . omnicompetence to judges.”131
Similarly, after Reynolds turned Justice Douglas’s suggestion into the
law of the land, Justice Harlan identiﬁed a series of empirical difﬁculties with the newly minted equal population principle. It couldn’t
“balance between keeping up with population shifts and having stable
districts,” nor could it say “how many legislative districts a State shall
have,” “what the shape of the districts shall be,” or “where to draw a
particular district line.”132 “In all these respects, courts will be called
upon to make particular decisions” that “are not amenable to the
development of judicial standards.”133
Fourth, the Rucho Court worried about the unseemliness of involving the federal courts in partisan disputes over redistricting. Redistricting is “‘a process that often produces ill will and distrust,’”
the Court stated.134 So it blanched at the idea that the “federal courts
are to ‘inject [themselves] into the most heated partisan issues’ by

127

Id.

128

Id at 2504.
See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 244 (1962) (Douglas, J, concurring) (suggesting that “a
State [may not] weight the vote of one county or one district more heavily than it weights the
vote in another”).
130
Id at 268 (Frankfurter, J, dissenting).
129

131

Id.

132

Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 621 (1964) (Harlan, J, dissenting).
Id; see also, for example, Avery v Midland County, 390 US 474, 487 (1968) (Harlan, J,
dissenting) (criticizing “these adventures of the Court in the realm of political science”).
133

134
Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2503 (2019) (quoting Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US
267, 307 (2004) (opinion of Kennedy, J)).
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adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims.”135 This “expansion of
judicial authority would not be into just any area of controversy, but
into one of the most intensely partisan aspects of American political
life.”136
Again, Justice Frankfurter aired this partisan entanglement point
ﬁrst. In Colegrove v Green, the 1946 case that was overruled by Baker,
he maintained that “the history of Congressional apportionment is
its embroilment in politics, in the sense of party contests and party
interests.”137 “From the determination of such issues this Court has
traditionally held aloof,” because “[i]t is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.”138 Justice
Frankfurter returned to this theme in his Baker dissent. “The Court’s
authority,” he warned, would be undermined by “injecting itself into
the clash of political forces in political settlements.”139 “It will add a
virulent source of friction and tension . . . to embroil the federal judiciary” in “[a]pportionment battles” that are “overwhelmingly party
or intraparty contests.”140
And ﬁfth, the Rucho Court thought it didn’t have to grapple with
gerrymandering because other actors could stop the practice instead.
In some states, “[p]rovisions in state statutes and state constitutions . . .
provide standards and guidance for state courts to apply.”141 “[O]ther
States are restricting partisan considerations in districting through
legislation,” in particular by “placing power to draw electoral districts
in the hands of independent commissions.”142 And Congress, too, has
the “power to do something about partisan gerrymandering in the
Elections Clause.”143 This authority underpins “[d]ozens of bills

135
136

Id (quoting Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109, 145 (1986) (opinion of O’Connor, J)).
Id at 2507.

137
328 US 549, 555 (1946) (plurality), rev’d, Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 (1962); see also id at
553 (“[T]his controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immediate and active
relations with party contests.”).
138

Id at 553–54.

139

Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J, dissenting); see also id (asserting
that the Court’s legitimacy is “nourished by the Court’s complete detachment . . . from
political entanglements”).
140
Id at 324; see also id (“[I]n every strand of this complicated, intricate web of values meet
the contending forces of partisan politics.”).
141
Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2507.
142

Id.

143

Id at 2508.
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[that] have been introduced to limit reliance on political considerations in redistricting.”144 The Court’s nonjusticiability holding thus
didn’t “condemn complaints about districting to echo into a void.”145
Once more, the 1960s dissenters were the original exponents of this
argument about other actors. In Colegrove, Justice Frankfurter noted
that “[a]uthority for dealing with [malapportionment] resides elsewhere.”146 Congress has “authority to secure fair representation by
the States in the popular House.”147 Another “remedy for unfairness
in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly.”148 In Baker, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the power of public
opinion. “[R]elief must come through an aroused popular conscience
that sears the conscience of the people’s representatives.”149 Justice
Harlan also observed in Baker that state institutions may equalize districts’ populations themselves. For the Court to intervene, then, would
“turn our backs on the regard which this Court has always shown for
the judgment of state legislatures and courts on matters of basically
local concern.”150
But so what if Rucho echoes the 1960s dissents? Why does it matter
that Rucho gives the same reasons for not confronting gerrymandering that Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Stewart provided for
allowing malapportionment to persist? It matters because it helps us
to understand Rucho, to place it in doctrinal and historical perspective.
Rucho plainly isn’t a novel decision, devising creative arguments for
holding gerrymandering nonjusticiable. Instead it’s a deeply familiar
decision, refusing to correct a democratic failure on the same grounds
that anti-Carolene Justices have always invoked for their inaction. It’s
a decision that wouldn’t have surprised had it been penned by the
minority faction of the Warren Court rather than by the namesake of
the Roberts Court.

144

Id.

145

Id at 2507.
Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549, 554 (1946) (plurality), rev’d, Baker v Carr, 369 US 186
(1962).
146

147
148

Id; see also id (“[T]he subject has been committed to the exclusive control of Congress.”).
Id at 556.

149
Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J, dissenting); see also id (“Appeal
must be to an informed, civically militant electorate.”).
150

Id at 332 (Harlan, J, dissenting).
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The parallels between Rucho and the 1960s dissents also matter
because the 1960s dissents were, well, dissents. Their objections to
federal courts addressing unequally populated districts were rejected,
not just once but over a series of major cases.151 Yet those same objections carried the day in Rucho. Anti-Carolene rationales that had been
thought discredited (or at least defunct) roared back to life, unabashedly espoused by a majority of the Justices. The point, of course, isn’t
that the Warren Court’s reapportionment decisions required Rucho
to come out the other way, let alone that Rucho overruled those decisions sub silentio. Stare decisis applies to the Court’s holdings, not
to its reasons. But the afﬁnity between Rucho and the 1960s dissents
does indicate that it’s outside the central current of the Court’s redistricting cases. If Rucho had followed from those cases, it would have
carefully considered their logic and implications. It wouldn’t have
repeated, time and again, the arguments those cases rebuffed.152
c. academic echoes
Just as Rucho should remind redistricting lawyers of the one-person,
one-vote dissents, it should evoke for scholars a speciﬁc literature:
the barrage of skeptical commentary that greeted the publication of
John Hart Ely’s landmark book, Democracy and Distrust, in 1980.153
Ely’s book was the academic analogue of the Warren Court’s reapportionment decisions: a full-throated defense of Carolene’s thesis
that democratic malfunction should prompt judicial intervention.
Also like those decisions, Democracy and Distrust was criticized as soon
as it appeared. Over the years, in fact, a whole cottage industry
emerged to attack Ely’s (and Carolene’s) idea of pro-democratic judicial review.
151
See John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across
the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U Miami L Rev 489, 501
(2002) (describing these objections as “consigned to the dustbin of history”).
152
For a similar view of Rucho, see Joey Fishkin, Rucho: A Sinkhole Dangerously Close to the
House, Election Law Blog ( July 1, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/2ZN8-8VUU. Also
notably, Rucho didn’t say a word about the Court’s racial vote dilution precedents, even
though they necessarily involve claims “for a fair share of political power and inﬂuence, with
all the justiciability conundrums that entails.” Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2502
(2019). See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Erasure of Racial Vote Dilution Doctrine, Election
Law Blog ( June 28, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/RH5W-JCHZ.
153
Ely, Democracy and Distrust (cited in note 3). For another scholar noting the connection
between partisan gerrymandering and Ely’s political process theory, see Karlan, 114 Yale L J
at 1349 (cited in note 103) (“[Ely] saw partisan line drawing . . . as a paradigmatic example of
Carolene Products process failure.”).
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This cottage industry, I argue here, supplies Rucho’s intellectual
scaffolding. Rucho’s reasons for holding gerrymandering nonjusticiable are also scholars’ reasons for resisting Ely’s political process
theory. Rucho therefore shouldn’t be seen exclusively in doctrinal
terms, as an exemplary reverse Carolene decision. It also reﬂects (one
side of ) the academic debate over Carolene, copying that camp’s claims
with eerie precision.
Consider Rucho’s conventional modalities point: that the Constitution’s text and history don’t support a judicial role in the ﬁght
against gerrymandering.154 Scholars on both the right and left criticized Ely (and Carolene) on just this basis—for urging the Court to
vindicate democratic values even though standard legal sources
don’t authorize this course of judicial action. Prominent conservative scholar and judge Robert Bork thus wrote that Ely’s “notion of
representation-reinforcement ﬁnds no support as a constitutional
value beyond those guarantees written into the [Constitution].”155
Well-known originalist Larry Alexander also pointed out that “Ely
cannot cite any provision in the Constitution” that endorses his “conception of broad participation in the processes of government.”156
Ely has no answer to “the troubling question of how [his] moral ideal
relates to the actual Constitution and its text.”157
Liberal academics who might not be expected to be as receptive to
textual and historical claims joined in this line of attack as well. Discussing Ely’s aspiration of majoritarian democracy, Lawrence Sager
asserted that “the reach of that ideal is no more determinately ﬁxed
by the text or structure of the Constitution than is the reach of other
rights-conferring principles.”158 Addressing an Ely-style proposal
that courts decide election law cases based on the democratic value of
154

See notes 104–07 and accompanying text.

155

Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash
U L Q 695, 699.
156
Larry A. Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and
Critique, 42 Ohio St L J 3, 10 (1981) (italics, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
157
Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 Fla L Rev 563, 569 n 25 (1989) (discussing vote-dilution doctrine); see also, for example, Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint
Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice 121 (Apr 3, 2019), archived at https://
perma.cc/Z75N-PLJF (commenting that, under Ely’s theory, “it is not the original meaning
of [constitutional] provisions that governs,” but rather “the representation reinforcement
principle”).
158
Lawrence G. Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 NYU L Rev 417,
423 (1981).
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competitiveness, Nathaniel Persily objected that “it is completely
disconnected from the text of the Constitution.”159 Even one of Ely’s
staunchest defenders in the academy, Michael Klarman, noted that
“[o]ne might well question the constitutional basis for this antientrenchment theory of judicial review.”160 “Its grounding is not, in
fact, the Constitution,” he candidly added.161
Or take Rucho’s argument that there’s no normative consensus
what a nongerrymandered district plan looks like, meaning judges
would have to resolve this value-laden issue themselves.162 A close
variant of this critique was the most famous riposte to Ely’s political
process theory. Ely had condemned all other approaches to constitutional interpretation on the ground that they allowed judges to
impose their own substantive preferences.163 A host of progressive
scholars retorted that Ely’s theory, too, despite the procedural name
he assigned it, required all kinds of substantive choices. For instance,
Laurence Tribe wrote that “[t]he process theme by itself determines
almost nothing unless its presuppositions are speciﬁed, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values—
the very sort of theory the process-perfecters are at such pains to
avoid.”164 Likewise, Mark Tushnet alleged that “[t]he fundamental
difﬁculty with Ely’s theory is that its basic premise, that obstacles to
political participation should be removed, is hardly value-free.”165
And according to Paul Brest, “in his heroic attempt to establish a
value-free mode of constitutional adjudication, John Hart Ely [came]
as close as anyone could to proving that it can’t be done.”166

159
Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 Harv L Rev 649, 652 (2002).
160
Klarman, 85 Geo L J at 499 (cited in note 44).
161
Id; see also, for example, Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging
Equality from Baker v Carr to Bush v Gore 153 (NYU, 2003) (noting the lack of “a ‘textual
hook’ upon which to hang” an election-law approach focused on competitiveness).
162
See notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
163

See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 1–72 (cited in note 3).
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
Yale L J 1063, 1064 (1980).
164

165
Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale L J 1037, 1045 (1980).
166
Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 Ohio St L J 131, 142 (1981); see also, for example,
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 Tex L Rev 1207, 1223 (1984) (“[I]t is impossible for the Court to
decide what is ‘fair’ or ‘just’ representation without making substantive value judgments.”);
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I just called this response to Ely a close variant of Rucho’s argument
about the absence of normative consensus as to fair redistricting. The
points aren’t identical because the former targets the very need to
make substantive (as opposed to procedural) choices while the latter
frets about the intractability of a particular substantive decision: deﬁning a nongerrymandered map. Other liberal academics, though,
foreshadowed Rucho’s argument even more accurately. The problem
with Ely’s approach, they contended, wasn’t that it asked judges to
tackle substantive issues; it was that the speciﬁc substantive issue it
forced them to confront—the right conception of democracy—is
indeterminate and unsuited to judicial resolution. Jack Balkin thus
observed that “at any point in time in American society there are
competing visions of what democracy requires: some in ascendance,
some in dissent, and some that are completely ‘off the wall.’”167 Jane
Schacter also charged that “Ely’s theory failed to treat democracy as
the essentially contested concept that it is.”168 And Ronald Dworkin
opined that Ely’s approach “might be persuasive if democracy were a
precise political concept,” or “if the American experience uniquely
deﬁned some particular conception of democracy.”169 “But none of
this is true.”170
Turn next to Rucho’s claim that courts lack the capacity to evaluate
district plans’ electoral effects.171 Progressive scholars expressed the
same grievance with Ely (and Carolene): that they obliged judges to
determine when democracy is, in fact, threatened by a given practice.
Even if a single deﬁnition of democracy could be selected, these
scholars maintained, judges don’t have the ability to ascertain when
the political process is operating smoothly and when it’s misﬁring.
In David Strauss’s words, “Ely’s theory requires judges to be amateur
political scientists: to determine when the channels of political
change are blocked.”172 Or as Guy-Uriel Charles put it, Ely’s
Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 Va L Rev
721, 723 (1991) (“Ely’s [theory] ultimately relies on substantive judgments, many of which are
extremely controversial.”).
167

Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 BU L Rev 1129, 1159 (2012).

168

Schacter, 57 Stan L Rev at 738 (cited in note 25).
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 NYU L Rev 469, 502 (1981).

169

170
Id; see also, for example, Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and
Equal Protection, 42 Ohio St L J 261, 306 (1981) (“[C]onsensus as to a certain sort of democratic process . . . is nonexistent.”).
171
See notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
172
David A. Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in Memory of
John Hart Ely, 57 Stan L Rev 761, 777 (2004).
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“inquiry presupposes that the Court is able to distinguish . . . a
properly functioning democratic process from an improperly functioning one.”173 Or per Heather Gerken and Michael Kang, “[j]udges
aren’t particularly adept at adjudicating the inherently [empirical]
claims at stake in election law cases.”174 “They don’t possess the
training to judge, let alone manage, politics.”175
And last,176 recall Rucho’s argument that courts would become
entangled in raw partisan politics if they decided gerrymandering
cases.177 This, too, was a common academic critique of Ely (and Carolene). Many electoral laws are adopted for partisan purposes, ran the
objection, so if courts strike down these measures because of their
undemocratic implications, then courts will inevitably be drawn into
heated partisan disputes. Following this logic, Peter Schuck called it
“a chilling prospect” for a court following political process theory to,
in effect, “prescrib[e] the partisan conﬁguration of the legislature—
the most political of tasks.”178 Gary Leedes also described “judicial
involvement in [the] pursuit of political power” as “a form of entanglement so potentially divisive and disruptive that it should be
avoided.”179 And Richard Hasen complained that “structural theories”
like Ely’s “require great intrusion by the judiciary into the political
processes” and so “are misguided and dangerous.”180
Again, my main goal here is to show the striking convergence between Rucho’s reasons for holding gerrymandering nonjusticiable and
173
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reﬂections on the
Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 NC L Rev 1103, 1134 (2002).
174
Heather K. Gerken and Michael S. Kang, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Courts, Corporate Law,
and Election Law, 126 Harv L Rev F 86, 88 (2013).
175
Id; see also, for example, Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law at 154 (cited in note
161) (“I have become skeptical that the judges [do] a good job examining the social science
evidence regarding the effects of court-mandated regulation of the political process.”).
176
A careful reader may note that Rucho gave one more reason for holding gerrymandering
nonjusticiable: that actors other than the federal courts may also take steps to stop gerrymandering. See notes 141–45 and accompanying text. This is Rucho’s sole justiﬁcation that’s
rooted only in the 1960s reapportionment dissents and not also in the academic literature
criticizing Ely.
177
See notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
178
Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation
of Politics, 87 Colum L Rev 1325, 1365 (1987) (discussing the regulation of partisan
gerrymandering)
179
Gary C. Leedes, Supreme Court Mess, 57 Tex L Rev 1361, 1424 (1979).
180
Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law at 139 (cited in note 161) (discussing Issacharoff and Pildes’s Ely-esque approach); see also, for example, Bruce E. Cain, Garrett’s
Temptation, 85 Va L Rev 1589, 1600 (1999) (“The structural approach leads inevitably to
intrusive judicial involvement in states’ political arrangements.”).
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the scholarly literature opposing Ely (and Carolene). Rucho doesn’t cite
this literature but it plainly echoes it—sings in its distinctive key.
However, I also want to note the irony of the many liberal attacks on
political process theory. Virtually every progressive scholar disagreed
with the Court’s decision in Rucho. By my count, almost a hundred
professors signed amicus briefs backing the Rucho plaintiffs, while
not one put her name on a brief for North Carolina.181 Yet the Rucho
Court channeled the progressive scholars’ anti-Ely arguments, ticking through them point by point. Those arguments provided the
intellectual backdrop that helped make the Court’s ruling possible.
Of course, the liberal critics mostly disparaged Ely from the left,
urging more judicial intervention on grounds beyond democracy promotion. Nevertheless, it’s remarkable how their own words came
back to haunt them in Rucho. In a striking case of unintended consequences, work advocating a broader judicial role ended up enabling
its contraction.
d. carolene’s enduring appeal
The above discussion may suggest that Rucho’s reasons for holding
gerrymandering nonjusticiable—which are also the 1960s dissenters’ reasons for thinking malapportionment a political question and
academics’ reasons for objecting to political process theory—are
highly persuasive. After all, I’ve now outlined those reasons several
times, but I haven’t yet identiﬁed any responses to them. I actually
don’t intend to rebut the arguments of the Rucho Court (and its kindred spirits) at length here. My aim in this article is to situate Rucho as a
reverse Carolene decision, not to defend Carolene-style pro-democratic
181
See, for example, Brief of 27 Election Law, Scientiﬁc Evidence, and Empirical Legal
Scholars as Amici Curiae, Rucho v Common Cause, No 18-422 (US ﬁled Mar 8, 2019); Brief of
Amici Curiae First Amendment and Election Law Scholars, Rucho v Common Cause, No 18422 (US ﬁled Mar 8, 2019); Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Rucho v Common Cause, No 18422 (US ﬁled Mar 8, 2019); Brief of Amici Curiae Political Science Professors, Rucho v
Common Cause, No 18-422 (US ﬁled Mar 8, 2019); Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Christopher Elmendorf et al, Rucho v Common Cause, No 18-422 (US ﬁled Mar 8, 2019); Brief of
Amici Curiae Professors Wesley Pegden et al, Rucho v Common Cause, No 18-422 ( US ﬁled
Mar 8, 2019); Brief of Professor D. Theodore Rave as Amicus Curiae, Rucho v Common Cause,
No 18-422 ( US ﬁled Mar 8, 2019).
Of course, there’s no irony when liberal scholars criticize political process theory and oppose
judicial intervention against partisan gerrymandering. That position is completely consistent.
See, for example, Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law (cited in note 161); Daniel H.
Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest:
Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L Rev 1 (1985); Persily, 116 Harv L Rev at 649 (cited in note 159).
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judicial review. As a backer of such review,182 though, I also don’t want
to leave the impression that Rucho’s rationales are unassailable. Accordingly, I now explain how Justice Kagan, in her Rucho dissent,
countered each of the majority’s points. Her refutation shows that the
debate over Carolene is just that: a genuine two-sided dialogue, not a
rout in favor of the anti-Carolene camp. Justice Kagan’s dissent also
demonstrates that even as the Court’s majority becomes increasingly
anti-Carolene, a vocal minority remains committed to Carolene’s thesis.
Start with the Rucho majority’s conventional modalities argument.183 Justice Kagan pointed out that, even if the Constitution’s
text and history don’t support a judicial role in the ﬁght against
gerrymandering, a third mode of interpretation, reasoning from precedent,184 does. “The Fourteenth Amendment, we long ago recognized,” forbids the practice of “vote dilution—the devaluation of one
citizen’s vote as compared to others.”185 This bar on dilutive policies
is why “this Court in its one-person-one-vote decisions prohibited
creating districts with signiﬁcantly different populations.”186 It’s also
why the Court subsequently recognized a cause of action for racial
vote dilution: the diminution of minority voters’ electoral inﬂuence
through at-large elections, carefully crafted districts, and other dilutive measures.187 Returning to partisan gerrymandering, “[t]he constitutional injury . . . is much the same, except that the dilution is
based on party afﬁliation.”188 “In such a case, too, the districters have
set out to reduce the weight of certain citizens’ votes, and thereby
deprive them of their capacity to fully and effectively participate in
the political process.”189

182
See, for example, Stephanopoulos, 114 Colum L Rev (cited in note 55); Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos and Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efﬁciency Gap, 82 U
Chi L Rev 831 (2015).
183
See notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
184
See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L
Rev 877 (1996).
185
Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2514 (2019) ( Kagan, J, dissenting); see also id at
2523 (“This Court has long understood that it has a special responsibility to remedy violations of constitutional rights resulting from politicians’ districting decisions.”).
186
187

Id at 2514.
See, for example, White v Regester, 412 US 755 (1973).

188

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2514 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

189

Id (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
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Justice Kagan also linked a different account of gerrymandering’s
constitutional harm to the Court’s precedent. On this view, the problem with the practice isn’t that it dilutes the votes of one party’s
adherents. The issue, instead, is that when the government gerrymanders, it injures voters because of their political beliefs and impedes
their ability to associate with one another, in contravention of longstanding First Amendment principles. Justice Kagan thus cited cases
holding that when the government “subject[s] certain voters to
‘disfavored treatment’ . . . because of ‘their voting history and their
expression of political views,’” it violates the First Amendment.190 She
referenced additional decisions establishing that when “the State
frustrates [voters’] efforts to translate [their] afﬁliations into political
effectiveness,” the First Amendment is offended as well.191 “In both of
those ways, partisan gerrymanders . . . undermine the protections of
‘democracy embodied in the First Amendment.’”192
The Court’s precedent supplied Justice Kagan with one more response to the Rucho majority’s argument about conventional modalities. If taken seriously, the Constitution’s text and history indicate that courts shouldn’t try to ﬁx any democratic malfunctions: not
partisan gerrymandering, and not malapportionment, racial vote
dilution, or voter suppression either.193 The Fourteenth Amendment,
in particular, was originally intended to protect civil but not political
rights,194 and its language in no way distinguishes between gerrymandering and any other democratic failure. Yet as Justice Kagan
remarked, “racial and residential gerrymanders were also once with
us, but the Court has done something about that fact.”195 The Court,
that is, has deemed those practices unconstitutional despite their
validity under textual and historical modes of reasoning. The Rucho
majority therefore can’t “frame [its] point as an originalist constitutional argument.”196 Originalism would negate almost all of election

190

Id (quoting Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267, 314 (2004) (opinion of Kennedy, J)).

191

Id (citing Cal. Dem. Party v Jones, 530 US 567, 574 (2000)); see also id (“[A]dded to that
strictly personal harm is an associational one.”).
192
Id (quoting Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347, 357 (1976)).
193

See notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
See generally Travis Crum, The Superﬂuous Fifteenth Amendment?, 114 Nw U L Rev
(forthcoming 2020).
194

195

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2512 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

196

Id.
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law, but the majority accepts “a role for the courts with respect to at
least some [redistricting] issues.”197
Consider, second, the Rucho majority’s claim that no normative
consensus exists as to what a nongerrymandered district plan looks
like.198 Relying on recent developments in the lower courts, Justice
Kagan ﬂatly denied this assertion. There now is consensus, she maintained, that a nongerrymandered plan is one that resembles maps that
are randomly generated by a computer algorithm based only on a
jurisdiction’s lawful, nonpartisan criteria. A plan isn’t a gerrymander,
in other words, if it lies within the distribution of randomly created
maps.199 The Rucho majority thus “misses something under its nose:
What it says can’t be done has been done.”200 “Over the past several
years, federal courts across the country . . . have largely converged on
a [single] standard.”201 This standard “takes as its baseline a State’s
own criteria of fairness, apart from partisan gain.”202 These criteria
are used to produce “a large collection of districting plans that incorporate the State’s physical and political geography.”203 Then “[w]e
can line up those maps on a continuum” and “see where the State’s
actual plan falls on the spectrum.”204 “The further out on the tail, the
more extreme the partisan distortion and the more signiﬁcant the
vote dilution.”205
This approach, Justice Kagan continued, neatly sidesteps all of the
Rucho majority’s allegedly unanswerable questions. How competitive
should a plan’s districts be?206 As vigorously contested as a state wants.
Id at 2495–96. Justice Kagan added that “any originalist argument would have to deal with
an inconvenient fact”: that “[t]he Framers originally viewed political parties themselves (let alone
their most partisan actions) with deep suspicion.” Id at 2512 n 1 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
197

198

See notes 112–17 and accompanying text.

199

Of course, the fact that lower courts have arrived at a consensus doesn’t mean it’s shared
by the rest of society. I, for one, have some discomfort with using randomly generated maps
as a baseline when the maps happen to be skewed in a party’s favor due to a state’s political
geography. In such cases, I would hesitate to deem a plan a gerrymander if it’s more symmetric in its treatment of the major parties than most simulated maps.
200
Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2516 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
201
Id; see also, for example, id at 2509 (“The majority’s abdication comes just when courts
across the country . . . have coalesced around manageable judicial standards to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims.”).
202

Id at 2516.

203

Id at 2518.
Id.

204
205

Id.

206

See note 113 and accompanying text.
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How should parties’ seats be related to their votes?207 It depends
on where voters happen to live and which nonpartisan districting
principles a state employs. How much compliance with these principles is enough?208 Again, it’s up to each state. In Justice Kagan’s
words, “the comparator (or baseline or touchstone) is the result not of
a judge’s philosophizing but of the State’s own characteristics and
judgments.”209 These factors “create[] a neutral baseline from which
to assess whether partisanship has run amok.”210 So the reference
point is not (what the Rucho majority thought it had to be) “the maps a
judge, with his own view of electoral fairness, could have dreamed
up.”211
Third, the Rucho majority contended that courts lack the capacity
to assess district plans’ electoral effects.212 To the contrary, Justice
Kagan responded, lower courts recently demonstrated their ability to
do exactly that. In the years leading up to Rucho, ﬁve district courts
(comprising ﬁfteen federal judges) considered, and ruled in favor of,
partisan gerrymandering claims in Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin.213 All of these cases involved voluminous
empirical testimony. And in all of them, the courts’ “ﬁndings about
these gerrymanders’ effects on voters . . . were evidence-based, databased, statistics-based”—“[k]nowledge-based, one might say.”214 The
courts “did not gaze into crystal balls, as the majority tries to suggest.”215 Instead “[t]hey evaluated with immense care the factual evidence . . . the parties presented.”216 “They looked hard at the facts,
and they went where the facts led them.”217
One conclusion to which the facts led them was that modern
gerrymanders are quite durable. Recall that the Rucho majority

207

See note 114 and accompanying text.

208

See note 115 and accompanying text.

209

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2520 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
Id.

210

211
Id; see also id at 2518 n 3 (“[T]his distribution of outcomes provides what the majority
says does not exist—a neutral comparator for the State’s own plan.”).
212
See notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
213

See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2513, 2518 (Kagan, J, dissenting) (describing most of these suits).

214

Id at 2519.
Id.

215
216

Id at 2525.

217

Id at 2519.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3483321

3]

THE ANTI-CAROLENE COURT

145

stressed the volatility of voters, who supposedly change their minds
from year to year, and split their tickets even in the same election, at a
high rate.218 The empirical evidence the lower courts heard contradicted these “unsupported and out-of-date musings about the unpredictability of the American voter.”219 In reality, today’s voters tend
to be strong partisans, meaning that party-switching over time and
ticket-splitting in a single election are both infrequent.220 As a result,
“maps constructed with so much expertise and care to make electoral
outcomes impervious to voting” don’t often “come apart.”221 Most
of the time, contemporary line-drawers “succeed[] in entrenching
themselves in ofﬁce” and thereby “beat[ing] democracy.”222
Fourth, the Rucho majority objected to courts’ entanglement in
partisan politics, red in tooth and claw.223 Justice Kagan replied that
cases’ partisan implications aren’t a justiﬁcation for judicial inaction.
Yes, gerrymanders “have great political consequence.”224 But this impact is harmful: “a cascade of negative results” including “the deathknell of bipartisanship,” “a legislative environment that is toxic and
tribal,” and “the polarized political system so many Americans
loathe.”225 These adverse outcomes oblige the Court to intervene, not
to stare impassively as democracy deteriorates. Gerrymanders “imperil our system of government,” and “[p]art of the Court’s role in
that system is to defend its foundations.”226
Justice Kagan also explained that courts’ partisan entanglement
wouldn’t be as extensive as the Rucho majority feared. For one thing,
her proposed standard (which mirrored that adopted by the lower
courts) would reach only the “worst-of-the-worst cases of democratic
subversion”: the handful of district plans designed with partisan motives and yielding large, durable, and unjustiﬁed partisan effects.227

218

See notes 126–28 and accompanying text.

219

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2519 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
See LWV Brief at 25–26 (cited in note 16).

220
221

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2519 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

222

Id; see also id at 2525 (“In North Carolina, however the political winds blow, there are
10 Republicans and 3 Democrats.”).
223

See notes 134–36 and accompanying text.

224

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2525 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
Id (quotation marks omitted).

225
226

Id at 2525.

227

Id at 2509.
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“[B]y requiring plaintiffs to make difﬁcult showings relating to both
purpose and effects, the standard [would] invalidate[] the most extreme, but only the most extreme, partisan gerrymanders.”228 For
another, if the Court struck down a map or two, line-drawers would
likely stop gerrymandering as much, and there would be less need for
judicial involvement. “[S]moking guns” where politicians “openly
proclaim their intent to entrench their party in ofﬁce” would “all but
disappear.”229 Fewer “ofﬁcials [would] continue[] to try implementing
extreme partisan gerrymanders.”230 After all, “[i]n districting cases
no less than others, ofﬁcials respond to what this Court determines
the law to sanction.”231
And ﬁfth, the Rucho majority argued that it need not act thanks to
the anti-gerrymandering efforts of other actors: legislators, voters via
direct democracy, and state courts.232 As to legislators, Justice Kagan
accented the obvious; they’re the people with the strongest incentive
to gerrymander, so “[n]o one can look to them for effective relief”
from the practice.233 Yes, a few reformers occasionally introduce “bills
limiting partisan gerrymanders.”234 But “what all these bills have in
common is that they are not laws.”235 As to voter initiatives, Justice
Kagan noted that they’re frequently unavailable; “[f ]ewer than half
the States” permit them.236 Even where voters can place measures
directly on the ballot, redistricting initiatives tend to trigger furious
opposition from the politicians whose mapmaking power is threatened. “[L]egislators often ﬁght [those] efforts tooth and nail”—and
often manage to defeat them.237
And as to state courts, Justice Kagan noted that they, too, are
courts. How can gerrymandering not be justiciable for federal courts,
228
Id at 2516; see also id at 2522 (“[T]he combined inquiry used in these cases set the bar
high, so that courts could intervene in the worst partisan gerrymanders, but no others.”).
229

Id at 2522–23.
Id at 2523; see also id at 2523 n 5 (“A decision of this Court invalidating the North
Carolina and Maryland gerrymanders would of course have curbed much of that behavior.”).
230

231

Id at 2523 n 5.

232

See notes 141–45 and accompanying text.
Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2523 (Kagan, J, dissenting); see also id at 2524 (“The politicians who
beneﬁt from partisan gerrymandering are unlikely to change partisan gerrymandering.”).
233

234
235

Id at 2523.
Id at 2524.

236

Id.

237

Id.
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then, when it is for their state counterparts? “[W ]hat do those courts
know that this Court does not?”238 “If they can develop and apply
neutral and manageable standards to identify unconstitutional gerrymanders, why couldn’t we?”239 The answer isn’t that state constitutions typically include more speciﬁc anti-gerrymandering provisions than the federal Constitution. For example, “[t]he Pennsylvania
Supreme Court based its gerrymandering decision on a constitutional
clause providing only that ‘elections shall be free and equal.’”240 Even
more starkly, two months after Rucho, a court invalidated North
Carolina’s state legislative maps based on that state’s analogues to the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.241 Those, of course, are the very
provisions from which the Rucho majority supposedly couldn’t derive a
workable test.
As I mentioned above, I think the debate between the Rucho majority and Justice Kagan has a winner.242 Point by point, I ﬁnd her
responses more persuasive than the majority’s reasons for holding
gerrymandering nonjusticiable. But even a reader inclined to agree
with the majority must concede that its anti-Carolene position hasn’t
swept the ﬁeld. Yes, that stance now commands the votes of ﬁve
Justices. But that’s all it commands. In the rest of the Court—and in
the lower federal courts that ruled in favor of gerrymandering challenges prior to Rucho, and in the state courts that continue to uphold these claims, and in the academy that nearly unanimously backs
judicial action against gerrymandering—Caroline’s message still appeals. David Strauss once provocatively titled an article, Is Carolene
Products Obsolete?243 Justice Kagan’s dissent shows that it’s not.

III. A Perverse Carolene Future?
More precisely, Justice Kagan’s dissent shows that Carolene
isn’t intellectually obsolete. Doctrinally, though—as a matter of
238

Id.

239

Id.
Id at 2424 n 6.

240

241
See Common Cause v Lewis, No 18 CVS 014001, 2019 WL 4569584 (NC Super Ct Sept 3,
2019).
242
See note 182 and accompanying text.
243
See Strauss, 2010 U Ill L Rev at 1251 (cited in note 60). Strauss also answered his
question in the negative. See id at 1269 (“If you have a better idea about what courts should
be doing in difﬁcult constitutional cases, let me know.”).
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constitutional law as fashioned by the current Court—Carolene is at
grave risk of extinction. One threat to it comes from reverse Carolene
decisions like Rucho. When the Court refuses to ﬁx democratic malfunctions, it doesn’t do the one thing that, Carolene holds, it should
prioritize above all else. But I want to turn in this Part to a new and
growing menace to Carolene: perverse (rather than reverse) Carolene
decisions in which the Court prevents other actors from curbing
democratic abuses and promoting democratic values.244 Perverse decisions compound the damage of reverse decisions. They represent
not judicial apathy in the face of democratic failure (bad enough, one
might think) but rather afﬁrmative judicial protection for the subversion of democracy.
Rucho’s subject, partisan gerrymandering, is one area where perverse Carolene decisions are on the horizon (though not yet overhead).
Nonjudicial actors often try to thwart gerrymandering by adopting
independent redistricting commissions. But there may now be ﬁve
votes on the Court (the same ﬁve votes that made up the Rucho majority) for the proposition that commissions with authority over congressional mapmaking unlawfully abridge state legislatures’ right to
draw the lines as they please. Other plausible challenges to commissions also wait in the wings. Outside the gerrymandering context,
perverse Carolene decisions may greet any congressional attempts to
defend the right to vote. The Roberts Court may view laws easing
franchise access as violations of states’ prerogatives to limit their electorates as they see ﬁt. And in the campaign ﬁnance arena, perverse
Carolene decisions already ﬁll the case reporters. The Roberts Court
has systematically blocked federal and state actors from countering the corrosive effects of massive electoral funding on American
democracy.
a. partisan gerrymandering
1. Elections Clause. In one of Rucho’s most startling passages, Chief
Justice Roberts framed redistricting commissions as a potential solution to the problem of gerrymandering. He observed that states are
increasingly “placing power to draw electoral districts in the hands
of independent commissions.”245 In the 2018 election, for instance,
244

See notes 68–69 and accompanying text.

245

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2507.
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“voters in Colorado and Michigan approved constitutional amendments creating multimember commissions that will be responsible . . .
for creating and approving district maps for congressional and state
legislative districts.”246 He also described “[t]he ﬁrst bill introduced in
the 116th Congress,” which “would require States to create 15-member
independent commissions to draw congressional districts.”247 This
bill followed an earlier congressional proposal to “require every State
to establish an independent commission to adopt redistricting plans.”248
By citing these efforts, the Court meant to show that it didn’t “condone partisan gerrymandering” or “condemn complaints about districting to echo into a void.”249 Commissions, the Court suggested,
could avert gerrymandering and address voters’ complaints about the
mapmaking process.
This passage isn’t startling because of its prescription. Commissions are a common—and compelling—antidote to gerrymandering.
Thirteen states currently use commissions to design their congressional districts, four of which switched to this line-drawing procedure
in 2018 alone.250 Abroad, every Western democracy whose legislators
are elected from single-member districts entrusts redistricting to a
commission.251 And for good reason. The root cause of gerrymandering is legislators’ self-interest: their desire to beneﬁt their party and
to shield themselves from meaningful competition. Commissions
remove legislators’ self-interest from the mapmaking equation. When
properly structured, they’re made up of members who don’t have a
personal stake in how the lines are drawn, and who set the boundaries
based on criteria other than partisan advantage and incumbent protection.252 As a result, commission-crafted plans are more compliant
246

Id.

247

Id at 2508.
Id.

248
249

Id at 2507.

250

See Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures, Redistricting Law 2010 at 197–99 (2009) (listing
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey, and Washington as states using congressional
redistricting commissions as of 2009). I also count Iowa, where a state agency designs congressional districts, in this group. Since 2009, California (2010), New York (2014), Colorado
(2018), Michigan (2018), Ohio (2018), and Utah (2018) have switched to congressional
commissions as well. See also Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, All About Redistricting,
archived at https://perma.cc/6E8W-X7BY.
251
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U Chi L Rev 769,
780–86 (2013).
252
For a longer version of this argument, see Stephanopoulos, 2015 U Chi Legal F at 489–
91 (cited in note 68).
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with traditional districting principles,253 more competitive,254 and
more balanced in their treatment of the major parties255 than maps
produced by politicians.
A majority of the Court was equally enthusiastic about commissions in the 2015 case Arizona State Legislature v Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission.256 Commissions “address the problem of
partisan gerrymandering—the drawing of legislative district lines to
subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party
in power,” the Court gushed.257 Commissions do so because they
“check legislators’ ability to choose the district lines they run in” and
“impede legislators from choosing their voters.”258 Commissions thus
“ensure that Members of Congress [will] have ‘an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.’”259 They “restore the core
principle of republican government, namely, that the voters should
choose their representatives, not the other way around.”260
The passage in Rucho is startling, then, because of its author rather
than its argument. Chief Justice Roberts, who presented commissions
as a solution to gerrymandering in Rucho, dissented in Arizona State Legislature, contending that Arizona’s congressional redistricting commission is unconstitutional. His logic was as follows: The Elections
Clause states that the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional
elections “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”261

253
See, for example, Vladimir Kogan and Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of the Citizens Commission Final Plans, 4 Cal J Pol & Pol’y 1, 11–16 (2012) (ﬁnding that
when California switched to a commission, its districts split fewer political subdivisions and
were more compact).
254
See, for example, Jamie L. Carson and Michael H. Crespin, The Effect of State
Redistricting Methods on Electoral Competition in United States House of Representatives Races, 4
St Pol & Pol’y Q 455, 461–62 (2004) (ﬁnding that commission usage increases the share of
House districts won by fewer than twenty points).
255
See, for example, Stephanopoulos, 2015 U Chi Legal F at 496–501 (cited in note 68)
(ﬁnding that commission usage reduces the partisan bias of state legislative and congressional
maps).
256
257
258

135 S Ct 2652 (2015).
Id at 2658; see also id at 2677 (commissions “curb the practice of gerrymandering”).
Id at 2675–76.

Id at 2677 (quoting Federalist 57 (Madison)); see also id at 2675 (commissions “advanc[e]
the prospect that Members of Congress will in fact be ‘chosen . . . by the People of the several
States’” (quoting US Const, Art I, § 2)).
259

260

Id at 2677 (quotation marks omitted).

261

US Const, Art I, § 4 (emphasis added).
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The “Legislature” is “the representative body which makes the laws of
the people.”262 But in Arizona, “redistricting is not carried out by the
legislature.”263 Instead, “an unelected body called the Independent
Redistricting Commission draws the lines.”264 Aggravating the Elections Clause violation, the commission gained its mapmaking authority from not a legislative delegation but rather a voter initiative in
which the legislature had no part.
Whatever the merits of this reasoning,265 it plainly amounts to a
perverse Carolene position. Partisan gerrymandering is undemocratic.
Arizona voters found a way to prevent gerrymandering by adopting a
commission. But the commission is unlawful because it offends the
Elections Clause. Therefore the power to redistrict must return to the
Arizona legislature, which will then be free to gerrymander to its
heart’s content. Or as Chief Justice Roberts put it, only slightly less
starkly: “The people of Arizona have concerns about the process of
congressional redistricting in their State,” in that they don’t want that
process to yield an undemocratic gerrymander.266 But alas, “the Elections Clause of the Constitution does not allow them to address those
concerns by displacing their legislature.”267 So the legislature must remain responsible for redistricting, and the people’s concerns about
gerrymandering must stay unresolved.
Nor is the Arizona commission any more vulnerable to this attack
than many other commissions. The Arizona commission’s plans go
directly into effect, without any need for legislative approval. So do
the congressional maps drawn by the California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Idaho, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, and Washington commissions.268 The Arizona commission was also created by a voter initiative that circumvented the legislature. So were the California and

262

Ariz. State Leg., 135 S Ct at 2679 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting).

263

Id at 2678 (emphasis added).
Id.

264

265
The majority’s main response is that “Legislature” actually means the “power that
makes laws,” and in Arizona, “initiatives adopted by the voters legislate for the State just as
measures passed by the representative body do.” Id at 2671 (quotation marks omitted).
266

Id at 2692 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting).

267

Id; see also, for example, id at 2678 (“No matter how concerned we may be about
partisanship in redistricting, this Court has no power to gerrymander the Constitution.”); id
at 2690 (“[A] law’s virtues as a policy innovation cannot redeem its inconsistency with the
Constitution.”).
268

See Levitt, Who Draws the Lines? (cited in note 250).
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Michigan congressional redistricting commissions.269 Chief Justice
Roberts’s perverse Carolene position would thus nullify most American commissions. In fact, it would nullify the best American commissions: the ones that are most insulated from the individuals—selfinterested legislators—who are most likely to gerrymander.270
Chief Justice Roberts’s position could actually sweep even more
broadly than that. Governors have the power to veto congressional
district plans in forty-ﬁve states.271 But governors are no more “the
representative body which makes the laws” than are voters acting via
direct democracy. Gubernatorial vetoes of congressional maps, then,
might be unlawful under the Elections Clause.272 Similarly, thirty
state constitutions specify criteria like compactness and respect for
political subdivisions for congressional districts.273 But state constitutions aren’t state statutes. They’re not enacted by state legislatures
pursuant to the bodies’ ordinary lawmaking processes. So they may
be invalid, too, to the extent that they regulate congressional redistricting. And courts play a ubiquitous role in disputes over congressional district plans. But the judiciary isn’t “the Legislature” either,
meaning this court function is suspect as well. In short, under Chief
Justice Roberts’s view, every nonlegislative actor might be constitutionally barred from participating in congressional redistricting. On
this account, not only would the fox be allowed to guard the henhouse,
the fox alone could do so.
It’s true that Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Arizona State Legislature was a dissent. But it was a dissent that three other Justices
joined,274 and one of the Justices in the majority, Justice Anthony
269
See generally Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives
to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J L & Pol 331 (2007) (discussing
redistricting initiatives throughout American history).
270
Chief Justice Roberts asserted that his view would “not affect most other redistricting
commissions” because they generally “play an ‘auxiliary role’ in congressional redistricting.”
Ariz. State Leg., 135 S Ct at 2691 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting). This is simply incorrect, at least
with respect to the commissions cited here.
271

See Levitt, Who Draws the Lines? (cited in note 250).
Chief Justice Roberts’s position might thus require the reversal of Smiley v Holm, 285
US 355 (1932), in which the Court approved a gubernatorial veto of a congressional map
against an Elections Clause challenge.
272

273
See Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures, Redistricting Law 2010 at 125–27 (cited in note 250).
Note that since this report’s publication, California, Colorado, Florida, New York, and Ohio
have adopted criteria for congressional districts.
274
These were Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. Justice Scalia’s replacement on the Court,
Justice Gorsuch, presumably shares his Elections Clause views.
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Kennedy, has now been replaced by Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Unlike
Justice Kennedy, Justice Kavanaugh believes that partisan gerrymandering is nonjusticiable; he was part of the Rucho majority.275 It’s
at least plausible (and maybe even probable276) that Justice Kavanaugh
would disagree with Justice Kennedy about the involvement of
nonlegislative actors in congressional redistricting, too.
It’s also the case that Chief Justice Roberts disclaimed the more
radical implications of his Elections Clause stance, writing that “the
state legislature need not be exclusive in congressional districting.”277
If this caveat were to hold, then gubernatorial vetoes, state constitutional criteria, and lawsuits would remain permissible with respect
to congressional districts. Unlike the Arizona commission, these measures don’t “totally displace[] the legislature from the redistricting process.”278 The caveat, however, is a classic ipse dixit. It’s asserted without
explanation after a long discussion of why “the Legislature” has to mean
“the representative body which makes the laws.”279 The caveat also
contradicts the preceding discussion. If that’s the right deﬁnition of
“the Legislature,” then how can the term encompass actors who are indisputably nonlegislative? How are congressional district lines “prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof ” if they’re shaped, in
part, by the governor, the state constitution, or a court? For these
reasons, the caveat seems unlikely to limit the scope of the perverse
Carolene revolution that Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent would augur,
if it gained one more vote.
2. Congressional authority. Even at its most extensive, though, this
revolution would affect only state regulations (by nonlegislative actors) of congressional redistricting. That was the sole topic addressed in
Arizona State Legislature by the majority or the dissenters. But what if
Congress tried to stop gerrymandering by requiring commissions to
design states’ congressional and state legislative maps? The ﬁrst bill
the House of Representatives passed in 2019, after switching from
275
In contrast, Justice Kennedy pointedly refused to join the Vieth plurality’s opinion
deeming gerrymandering nonjusticiable.
276
Maybe probable because, to date, Justice Kavanaugh’s voting behavior on the Court has
been nearly identical to Chief Justice Roberts’s. See, for example, Adam Feldman, So Happy
Together, SCOTUSblog (May 23, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/UH56-V5QS.
277
Ariz. State Leg. v Ariz. Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S Ct 2652, 2687 (2015)
(Roberts, CJ, dissenting) (emphasis added).
278

Id at 2691 (emphasis added).

279

See id at 2678–87.
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Republican to Democratic control, would oblige states to create and
use commissions for their congressional plans.280 (This bill was the
Rucho majority’s lead example of how Congress could still curb redistricting abuses even after the Court withdrew from the ﬁeld.281)
Several commentators have also urged that the bill’s coverage be
broadened from congressional to state legislative maps, on the
ground that the latter are just as susceptible to gerrymandering as the
former.282
It’s not alarmist to fear that this sort of legislation would receive a
hostile reception from the Roberts Court. In the 1990s, an earlier
conservative majority announced the so-called “anti-commandeering”
doctrine, under which “the Federal Government may not compel the
States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”283 In a 2003 case, six Justices agreed (albeit in
dicta) that the anti-commandeering doctrine applies to the Elections
Clause: the most explicit grant of power to Congress to ﬁght gerrymandering. Writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Antonin Scalia
emphasized that his interpretation of a federal redistricting statute
wouldn’t “permit[] a commandeering of the machinery of state government.”284 Concurring for herself and Justice Clarence Thomas,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor rejected the view that “the anticommandeering jurisprudence is inapplicable to” the Elections Clause
simply because that provision afﬁrmatively contemplates congressional regulation of federal elections.285

280
See HR 1, 116th Cong, 1st Sess, §§ 2400–35 (2019). This bill has gone nowhere in the
Republican-controlled Senate.
281

See Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2508 (2019).
I’m one of these commentators. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, H.R. 1 and Redistricting
Commissions, Election Law Blog (Jan 9, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/C77S-P8HB; see
also, for example, Ryan P. Bates, Note, Congressional Authority to Require State Adoption of
Independent Redistricting Commissions, 55 Duke L J 333, 338 (2005) (“Congress would be both
authorized and justiﬁed in requiring the states to adopt independent and nonpartisan
commissions . . . both for congressional and state legislative districts.”).
282

283
Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 925 (1997); see also, for example, New York v United
States, 505 US 144, 162 (1992) (Congress lacks “the ability to require the States to govern
according to Congress’ instructions”).
284

Branch v Smith, 538 US 254, 280 (2003) (plurality).

285

Id at 301 (O’Connor, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). But note that some
lower courts, in cases prior to Branch, held that Congress may commandeer state governments when it legislates under the Elections Clause. See, for example, Condon v Reno, 913
F Supp 946, 965 (DSC 1995); Wilson v United States, 878 F Supp 1324, 1327–28 ( ND Cal
1995).
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If Congress can’t commandeer state governments when it legislates under the Elections Clause, then it’s easy to see why the House’s
recently passed bill might skate on thin constitutional ice. The bill
states that “[e]ach State shall establish a nonpartisan agency in the
legislative branch.”286 This agency “shall establish an independent
redistricting commission” pursuant to a detailed appointment procedure.287 And the commission, in turn, “shall establish singlemember congressional districts” that comply with several speciﬁed
criteria.288 All these shalls are federal orders to the states: binding rules
how (and by whom) their congressional districts must be drawn in
subsequent cycles. That’s why the House’s bill, according to its conservative critics, “would likely run into the Supreme Court’s doctrine
against federal ‘commandeering,’ ”289 and “would surely invite legal
challenge as a violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine.”290
This objection would hold regardless of the electoral level. The
allegation of commandeering, in other words, would apply whether
Congress legislated about congressional or state legislative plans. If
Congress required commissions to be used for state legislative maps,
however, it would run into an additional obstacle. The Elections
Clause only empowers Congress to regulate federal elections.291 So to
tackle gerrymandering at the state legislative level, Congress would
have to ﬁnd another source of regulatory authority. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Enforcement Clause is the most likely candidate,
given the Court’s view (even in Rucho) that extreme gerrymandering
violates the Equal Protection Clause.292 But the Court has sharply
restricted Congress’s ability to legislate in furtherance of Fourteenth
Amendment values. With respect to any enforcement statute, “[t]here
must be a congruence and proportionality” between Congress’s

286
287
288

HR 1, 116th Cong, 1st Sess, §§ 2414(a)(1) (2019) (emphasis added).
Id § 2411(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Id § 2413(a)(1) (emphasis added).

289

Walter Olson, House Passes Political-Omnibus Bill H.R 1, Cato at Liberty (Mar 11, 2019),
archived at https://perma.cc/2RQM-TP2R.
290
Ilya Shapiro and Nathan Harvey, What Left-Wing Populism Looks Like, National Review
(Mar 7, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/8T9U-JCCZ.
291
See US Const, Art I, § 4 (referring to “Elections for Senators and Representatives”).
292
See, for example, Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2504 (2019) (arguing that
“separating constitutional from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering” is impossible, but
not disputing that unconstitutional gerrymandering exists).
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means and the underlying constitutional “injury to be prevented or
remedied.”293
Rucho itself raises doubts whether the compulsory use of commissions is a congruent and proportional response to the problem
of gerrymandering. To repeat, commissions are appealing because
they’re made up of members who have no incentive to beneﬁt any
candidate or party.294 The Rucho majority, though, held that “securing
partisan advantage” is “[a] permissible intent” that “does not indicate
that the districting was improper.”295 In that case, commissions’ removal of partisanship from the mapmaking process might be a non
sequitur: a measure unrelated to the harm of gerrymandering, as
understood by the Rucho majority. The House’s bill also stipulates
that districts must abide by traditional districting principles and must
not, “when considered on a Statewide basis, unduly favor or disfavor
any political party.”296 But the Rucho majority thought that “adherence to ‘traditional’ districting criteria” is just another contestable
“vision[ ] of fairness.”297 It even more stridently criticized the idea
that “a districting map is . . . unconstitutional because it makes it
too difﬁcult for one party to translate statewide support into seats
in the legislature.”298 Again, then, core elements of the House’s
bill may have little to do with the Rucho majority’s conception of
gerrymandering.
There are good rejoinders, of course, to these arguments that
Congress is powerless to force the use of redistricting commissions.299
But whatever their ﬂaws, the arguments are far from “off the wall,”300

293

City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 520 (1997).

294

See notes 250–60 and accompanying text.
Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2503 (emphasis added).

295
296

HR 1, 116th Cong, 1st Sess, §§ 2413(a)(1)–(2) (2019).

297

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2500.
Id at 2499.

298

299
To wit: The anti-commandeering doctrine has no textual basis and needlessly prevents
Congress from relying on mandates to states in circumstances where they’re the most effective tool. And the Rucho majority’s view that gerrymandering is unrelated to partisan intent, noncompliance with traditional districting principles, and extreme partisan asymmetry is
strange, to say the least. On an ordinary account of gerrymandering, commissions are certainly a congruent and proportional response to it, since they prevent it from occurring in the
ﬁrst place.
300
See, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust
World 177–83 (Harvard, 2011) (discussing how constitutional arguments can go from “off the
wall” to “on the wall”).
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given the Roberts Court’s prior record, as well as paradigmatic examples of perverse Carolene claims. No one (not even the Rucho
majority) “disputes [that] gerrymanders undermine democracy.”301
Independent commissions are a common mechanism, in America
and abroad, for preventing gerrymandering. But if Congress were
to require commissions to redistrict, it’s possible the Roberts Court
would nullify its policy, thus allowing states to continue to gerrymander. This might be a correct decision, based on conventional
modes of constitutional reasoning, or it might be a wrong one. From
a Carolene perspective, though, it would certainly be a perverse one.
3. First Amendment. Opponents of independent redistricting
commissions have one last arrow in their quiver. According to a recently ﬁled complaint against Michigan’s commission, the body’s
membership criteria violate the First Amendment.302 These criteria
exclude candidates for ofﬁce, elected ofﬁcials, party leaders, lobbyists, and the like from serving on the commission.303 This exclusion,
the complaint asserts, is unlawful discrimination in hiring based on
prospective employees’ political beliefs. “In excluding certain categories of citizens from eligibility based on their exercise of core First
Amendment rights . . . the State has unconstitutionally conditioned
eligibility for a valuable beneﬁt on their willingness to limit their
First Amendment right[s].”304
Like the other looming challenges to commissions, this First
Amendment claim can’t be ignored. It builds on the Roberts Court’s
campaign ﬁnance precedents: cases that, as I discuss below, take a
very expansive view of political speech and association.305 The claim
is also supported by the Court’s earlier decisions holding that the
government can’t hire or ﬁre employees because of their partisan afﬁliations.306 Generalizing from these decisions, the complaint plausibly states that “[c]onditions of employment that compel or restrain

301

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2512 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
See Complaint, Daunt v Benson, No 1:19-cv-00614 (WD Mich ﬁled July 30, 2019)
(“Daunt Complaint”).
302

303
304
305

See id ¶ 1.
Id ¶ 46.
See id ¶ 53 (citing Randall v Sorrell, 548 US 230 (2006)).

306

See, for example, Rutan v Republican Party of Ill., 497 US 62 (1990); Elrod v Burns, 427
US 347 (1976).
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belief and association . . . are inimical to the process which undergirds
our system of government.”307
The First Amendment theory would have more dramatic consequences, too, than the other objections to commissions. Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissent in Arizona State Legislature would only bar voters
(and maybe other nonlegislative actors) from regulating congressional redistricting. The anti-commandeering and congruence-andproportionality doctrines would only impede congressional attempts
to compel the use of commissions. In contrast, the First Amendment
theory would extend to all commissions, whether created by voter
initiative, state legislation, or Congress, and whether responsible
for congressional or state legislative redistricting. All commissions
would be unconstitutional if they excluded certain citizens from
membership, and all commissions would have to throw open their
doors to all comers to remain in operation.
This would be another perverse Carolene outcome—indeed, a
perverse Carolene outcome with a twist. If a commission were shuttered because of its exclusionary membership criteria (the fate the
lawsuit says should befall Michigan’s new body308), then the usual
logic would apply. A court would have stopped a nonjudicial actor
from addressing gerrymandering, ensuring that undemocratic redistricting practices would persist. On the other hand, if a commission dropped its membership criteria to avoid offending (this view of )
the First Amendment,309 then its capacity to draw fair lines would be
compromised. Instead of being staffed by members with no reason

307
Daunt Complaint ¶ 44 (cited in note 302). Again, that this argument is plausible under
current law doesn’t mean it’s compelling. The Court’s patronage cases allow the government
to “choos[e] or dismiss[ ] certain high-level employees on the basis of their political views.”
Rutan, 497 US at 74. Members of a redistricting commission are certainly “high-level employees.” It’s also more problematic for the government to hire or ﬁre a particular party’s
adherents than for the government to exclude all highly partisan individuals from positions
that are meant to be nonpartisan. Only the former is viewpoint discrimination. And even if
the Michigan commission’s membership criteria burden First Amendment rights and trigger
heightened scrutiny, they should survive it. A commission staffed by partisans is unlikely to
achieve its goal of preventing partisan gerrymandering. See Leah Litman, Republicans Say the
First Amendment Protects the Right to Gerrymander, Slate (Aug 5, 2019), archived at https://
perma.cc/5DVP-QAF5.
308
See Daunt Complaint ¶¶ 48–56 (cited in note 302) (arguing that the Michigan
commission’s membership criteria can’t be severed from the rest of the measure establishing
the body).
309
Of course, most commissions can’t voluntarily drop their membership criteria because
those criteria are prescribed by the legal instruments that created the bodies.
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to seek partisan advantage or protect incumbents, the commission
would have to welcome the individuals with the strongest incentive
to pursue these goals. The commission could stay in business, but at
the behest of the judiciary, it would have to let the fox back in the
henhouse.
b. other areas
1. The right to vote. All the perverse Carolene arguments, to this
point, have been drawn from the partisan gerrymandering context.
If accepted by the Roberts Court—a real possibility—they would
invalidate redistricting commissions and thus thwart the main nonjudicial response to gerrymandering. Perverse Carolene claims, however, are hardly conﬁned to the gerrymandering arena. They’re
increasingly being advanced in other election law ﬁelds, and the
Roberts Court seems increasingly receptive to them. I now turn to
these other ﬁelds, starting with the right to vote. I keep my discussion
brief since the other ﬁelds aren’t my focus in this article.
Access to the franchise, then, is often limited by state and local
governments. Jurisdictions prohibit ex-felons from voting.310 They
require photo identiﬁcation to vote and proof of citizenship to register to vote.311 They close polling places and cut the period for early
voting.312 And they do so more and more; voting barriers have been
erected over the last decade at the highest rate since the civil rights
era.313 These measures are obviously offensive from a Carolene perspective. They abridge a democratic value—political participation—
that everyone agrees is protected by Carolene.314 They don’t need
more sophisticated democratic theories of majoritarianism or responsiveness to be condemned.315 And they burden a freedom, “the
right to vote,” that’s Carolene’s lead example of “those political

310
See Felon Voting Rights, Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures (Dec 21, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/2CBK-ATEG.
311
See Voter Identiﬁcation Requirements, Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures ( Jan 17, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/B4XU-CZNC.
312
See Christopher Ingraham, Thousands of Polling Places Were Closed over the Past Decade.
Here’s Where, Wash Post (Oct 26, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/T7AB-MDLU.
313
See New Voting Restrictions in America, Brennan Center for Justice (May 10, 2017),
archived at https://perma.cc/B4XU-CZNC.
314

See Part I.

315

See id.
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processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation.”316
A correct Carolene decision would therefore strike down a voting
restriction.317 The Roberts Court has issued no such rulings; it has
never nulliﬁed a law making it harder to vote.318 A reverse Carolene
decision, on the other hand, would uphold a voting restriction and so
allow a jurisdiction to impede political participation. The Roberts
Court has made several such rulings, sustaining, for instance, Indiana’s photo ID requirement for voting319 and Ohio’s policy of purging nonvoters from the rolls.320 And for a perverse Carolene decision
to be possible, a nonjudicial actor would ﬁrst have to facilitate access
to the franchise. Most intuitively, Congress or a state government
could enact a law permitting more people to vote or making voting
easier for everybody.
The ﬁrst bill the House of Representatives passed in 2019—the
same bill that would mandate redistricting commissions—would
do just that. Among other things, the bill would end the disenfranchisement of ex-felons, prohibit photo ID requirements for voting,
ban purges of the voter rolls, and set a ﬂoor of ﬁfteen days for early
voting.321 The bill, that is, would reverse most of the recent efforts by
subfederal jurisdictions to inhibit voting. In addition, a number of
states have liberalized their voting rules over the last few years. In
particular, automatic voter registration—registering citizens when
they interact with government agencies unless they afﬁrmatively decline to be enrolled—has been adopted by sixteen states since 2015.322
316

United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).

317

I don’t mean to suggest that Carolene requires all voting restrictions to be struck down.
Some restrictions serve compelling governmental interests like an orderly electoral process
and others are justiﬁed by normative judgments about who belongs to the political community. Carolene is thus better understood as a thumb on the scale for (not an absolute guarantee of ) easier political participation by more people.
318
Though on a few occasions, the Roberts Court has concluded it was too close to an
election to disturb lower-court rulings striking down voting restrictions. See, for example,
Frank v Walker, 135 S Ct 7 (2014) (vacating the Seventh Circuit’s election-eve stay of a
district court’s injunction barring the use of Wisconsin’s photo ID law). The Roberts Court
also held in Arizona v Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 US 1, 16 (2013), that Arizona’s proofof-citizenship requirement for voter registration was preempted by the National Voter
Registration Act. However, this was a statutory rather than a constitutional ruling.
319
320
321

See Crawford v Marion County Elections Bd., 553 US 181 (2008) (plurality).
See Husted v A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S Ct 1833 (2018).
See HR 1, 116th Cong, 1st Sess, §§ 1401–08, 1201–02, 1611, 1903 (2019).

322

See Automatic Voter Registration, Brennan Center for Justice ( July 10, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/JQ7C-8DBH.
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If it became law, however, the House’s bill would face a plausible
constitutional challenge. Congress, again, is authorized by the Elections Clause to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal
elections.323 The Qualiﬁcations Clause, though, enables states to specify “the Qualiﬁcations requisite for [their] Electors” in state and federal elections.324 Provisions like enfranchising ex-felons and allowing
citizens to vote without photo IDs, the argument would thus run,
exceed Congress’s Elections Clause authority because they’re not
procedural regulations but rather attempts to choose states’ voting
qualiﬁcations for them. On this view, not having been convicted of a
felony and possessing a valid ID are eligibility criteria that some states
have adopted for voting, which Congress may not displace. As the
Court put it in a 2013 case, “the Elections Clause empowers Congress
to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in
them.”325 “One cannot read the Elections Clause as treating implicitly
what [the Qualiﬁcations Clause] regulate[s] explicitly.”326
The Roberts Court might also be skeptical of automatic voter registration. In recent cases, the Court has deemed it unlawful “compelled speech” when public employees were required to pay dues to
support unions’ collective bargaining327 and political328 activities.
Voter registration is arguably as communicative as union dues, indicating citizens’ preferences to be included in the voter rolls and to
participate in future elections.329 Nor does it necessarily solve the
coercion problem if citizens can decline to be registered, since in the
Court’s words, “[a]n opt-out system [still] creates a risk that [speech]
will be used to further political and ideological ends with which
[citizens] do not agree.”330 Parroting these points, the conservative
323

See Part II.A.2.
US Const, Art I, § 2 (House elections); see also US Const, Amend XVII (Senate
elections).
324

325
Arizona v Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 US 1, 16 (2013); see also id at 31 (Thomas, J,
dissenting) (“The text of the Times, Places and Manner Clause . . . cannot be read to authorize Congress to dictate voter eligibility to the States.”). One response to this argument is
doctrinal. In Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970), the Court upheld a statutory provision
lowering the voting age to eighteen in federal elections. The Court, in other words, allowed
Congress to alter states’ qualiﬁcations for voting.
326
Inter Tribal, 570 US at 16.
327

See Janus v AFSCME, 138 S Ct 2448 (2018).

328

See Knox v SEIU, 567 US 298 (2012).
Only arguably; one response is that voter registration expresses no political view at all
and is better understood as bureaucratic record keeping.
329

330

Knox, 567 US at 312.
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chair of the Election Assistance Commission has called voter registration “the embodiment of political speech protected by the First
Amendment.”331 Because “not registering to vote is a choice” just like
registering is, “opt-out” allegedly isn’t “adequate in the voter registration context.”332
Right or wrong on non-Carolene grounds,333 these are quintessential perverse Carolene claims. If the Qualiﬁcations Clause bars Congress from enfranchising ex-felons or allowing citizens to vote
without photo IDs, then states will keep limiting their electorates in
these ways. Thanks to the judiciary, political participation will continue to be curbed, despite a nonjudicial actor’s attempt to expand it.
Likewise, if the First Amendment forbids states (and Congress) from
registering citizens automatically, then many citizens will remain
unregistered. The voter pool won’t be as deep as it could be, again
because of the courts and against the wishes of the elected branches.
2. Campaign ﬁnance. Proceeding to campaign ﬁnance, it’s the one
area I examine where private activity—the funding of elections by
wealthy individuals and organizations—constitutes the threat to democratic values. A large campaign contribution or expenditure may form
half of a corrupt quid pro quo exchange, in which a candidate promises
an ofﬁcial act in return for the money.334 In this case, the act reﬂects the
funder’s rather than the electorate’s priorities. Even when quids and
quos aren’t explicitly linked, politicians may be more responsive to
those who give and spend on their behalf, and less attuned to their
actual constituents. In this case, too, governmental policy may be more
congruent with funders’ than with voters’ preferences. And because
incumbent politicians may have stronger relationships with campaign
donors and spenders (having already built those relationships to get
elected), they may ﬁnd it easier than challengers to raise funds.
Challengers, then, may face the dual hurdles of opponents who are

331
Christy McCormick, Motor Voter Registration: Modernization and Challenges 6, at https://
electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/Presentation_Christy_McCormick.pdf.
332
Id; see also id at 5–6 (citing Knox and Janus).
333
As noted above, I think these arguments are ﬂawed on non-Carolene grounds too. See
notes 325, 329.
334
The Roberts Court has asserted that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption,” Citizens United v FEC, 558 US 310, 357 (2010),
but that’s simply its ipse dixit, unsubstantiated by any evidence about the links between independent spending and corruption.
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better known and better funded, yielding a lower level of electoral
competition.335
Empirical evidence (which I recap here but have covered in more
depth elsewhere336) conﬁrms these effects. The ideological distributions of elected ofﬁcials and of campaign donors are nearly identical:
sharply bimodal patterns in which almost everyone is liberal or conservative and next to no one is politically moderate.337 In contrast, the
ideological distribution of the general public resembles a bell curve:
fattest in the political center and thinning quickly to the left and
right.338 These ﬁndings suggest that campaign contributions lead
politicians to mirror their donors’ and discount their constituents’
views. Why else would politicians risk ignoring the positions of the
median voter?339
Similarly, when electoral funding is less regulated, incumbents
massively outraise challengers and beat them by huge margins, on
average.340 But when electoral funding is restricted by contribution
limits,341 or subsidized by public ﬁnancing,342 incumbents’ ﬁscal advantage shrinks signiﬁcantly. Contribution limits have more bite for
incumbents because they’re able to solicit more and larger donations.
Public ﬁnancing is also more helpful for challengers because they’re
more cash strapped in the absence of governmental funds. And the
result of greater resource parity is more electoral competition. When
contribution limits and public ﬁnancing are in place, incumbents tend

335
I explore these threats to democratic values in more detail, while focusing on the possibility of campaign funding causing misalignment, in Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning
Campaign Finance Law, 101 Va L Rev 1425 (2015).
336
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law, 112 Nw U
L Rev 989, 1047–52 (2018); Stephanopoulos, 101 Va L Rev at 1474–79 (cited in note 335).
337
See, for example, Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and
Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 Am Pol Sci Rev
519, 536–37 (2010); Michael J. Barber, Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and
Voters in the U.S. Senate, 80 Pub Opinion Q 225, 236–37 (2016).
338
See sources cited in note 337.
339
There are actually several more reasons: politicians’ own ideologies, pressure from party
activists and leaders, strategies for professional advancement, and so on. Campaign ﬁnance is
one, but not the only, explanation for misalignment between voters and their representatives.
340
See, for example, Thomas Stratmann, How Close Is Fundraising in Contested Elections in
States with Low Contribution Limits? 9 (May 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/XL2V-96WZ.
341
See, for example, Thomas Stratmann and Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo, Competition
Policy for Elections: Do Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?, 127 Pub Choice 177, 198 (2006).
342
See, for example, Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate
Polarization 11–12 ( Jan 13, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/43JP-SYAX.
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to win by narrower margins and to be ousted more often by their
opponents.343
Given this evidence, a correct Carolene decision would curb the
private (or expand the public) funding of campaigns. It would thus
reduce corruption, improve the ideological alignment of voters and
politicians, and trigger more competitive elections, all in one stroke.
Such a ruling, though, is hard to imagine in our constitutional order.
In general, only state action can violate the Constitution, and private
activity—even democratically destructive private activity—is constitutionally valid. By the same token, a reverse Carolene decision would
be an odd concept. Technically, it would be a ruling declining to cut
private (or boost public) campaign ﬁnance, thereby allowing the democratic harms of money in politics to persist. But again, it’s awkward to
criticize judicial passivity in this context since judicial intervention, here,
is so foreign to the American legal framework.
On the other hand, a perverse Carolene decision is quite easy to
conceptualize. It’s simply a ruling blocking an attempt by a nonjudicial actor, like Congress or a state government, to regulate electoral
funding and so to ﬁght corruption, promote majoritarianism, and
enhance competition. Perverse Carolene decisions aren’t just readily
imaginable; they’re also doctrinally plentiful. In recent years, the
Roberts Court has struck down regular contribution limits344 as well
as aggregate limits on how much donors can give to all recipients.345 It
has ﬁrst narrowed346 and then eliminated347 the federal ban on corporate and union electoral spending. It has invalidated a law loosening contribution limits for candidates running against personally
wealthy opponents.348 And it has nulliﬁed a public ﬁnancing scheme
that tied the government’s subsidies to the disbursements of privately
funded candidates.349 In all these cases, the Court’s position was that
the First Amendment protects the funding of elections and that the
343
See, for example, Neil Malhotra, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competition:
Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 8 St Pol & Pol’y Q 263, 274, 276 (2008); Thomas Stratmann, Do Low Contribution Limits Insulate Incumbents from Competition?, 9 Election L J 125,
135 (2010).
344
See Randall v Sorrell, 548 US 230 (2006) (plurality).
345

See McCutcheon v FEC, 572 US 185 (2014) (plurality).

346

See FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 US 449 (2007) (plurality).
See Citizens United v FEC, 558 US 310 (2010).

347
348

See Davis v FEC, 554 US 724 (2008).

349

See Ariz. Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v Bennett, 564 US 721 (2011).
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government’s interests—even pro-democratic ones—can’t justify the
free speech burdens.
These cases’ proponents, though, wouldn’t concede that they’re
perverse Carolene decisions. Instead they would argue that they’re
correct Carolene decisions, intervening against laws that imperil democratic values. The proponents’ reasoning is that most campaign ﬁnance regulations are enacted by self-interested incumbents. Surely
these politicians wouldn’t support measures that weaken their grip on
their own ofﬁces. The proponents add that, to overcome voters’ familiarity with incumbents, challengers typically need to raise and
spend large sums of money. But campaign ﬁnance regulations impede
this funding process, thereby lowering challengers’ odds of success.
As Justice Scalia wrote in a 2003 case, “[t]he ﬁrst instinct of power is
the retention of power,” and “that is best achieved by the suppression
of election-time speech.”350 “[A]ny restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers and incumbents
tends to favor incumbents.”351 Or as Chief Justice Roberts put it in
2014, “those who govern should be the last people to help decide who
should govern.”352 When incumbents do limit electoral funding, they
“compromis[e] the political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process” by “favor[ing] some participants in that process”
(themselves) “over others” (challengers).353
Scholars, even some progressives, have echoed this claim that the
Roberts Court’s campaign ﬁnance cases are correct Carolene decisions. “When incumbents limit the speech of their challengers . . . the
Court’s services as a referee are most urgently needed,” Kathleen
Sullivan and Pamela Karlan have asserted, in a piece trying to divine
how Ely himself would have approached regulations of electoral
funding.354 Laurence Tribe has also explained how a “skeptical view”
350
351
352

McConnell v FEC, 540 US 93, 263 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J).
Id at 249.
McCutcheon v FEC, 572 US 185, 192 (2014) (plurality).

353

Id at 227; see also, for example, Citizens United v FEC, 558 US 310, 354 (2010) (claiming
that, by banning electoral spending by corporations, “the Government prevents their voices
and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are
hostile to their interest”); Davis v FEC, 554 US 724, 742 (2008) (maintaining that campaign
ﬁnance regulations “arrogate the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates
competing for ofﬁce” and “use the election laws to inﬂuence the voters’ choices”).
354
Sullivan and Karlan, 57 Stan L Rev at 702 (cited in note 95); see also Pamela S. Karlan,
Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv L Rev 1, 30 (2012) (“It certainly is possible to
defend the result in Citizens United as an application of process theory.”).
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of these laws, rooted in “a particular fear that legislatures will enact
incumbent-protection provisions,” “ﬁts ﬁrmly into the political process tradition” and is “a descendant of the Warren Court’s reapportionment cases.”355 And Jack Balkin has contended that “Citizens
United offers the conservative version of Ely’s Democracy and Distrust.”356 The decision “worries that because of defects in the political
process, Congress is trying to snuff out political speech by defenseless
corporations.”357
As noted above,358 both the Roberts Court and these academics
have it wrong. In fact, most campaign ﬁnance regulations disadvantage incumbents and increase competition.359 Most campaign ﬁnance
laws were also passed by reformers in rare moments following corruption scandals—not by self-interested incumbents practicing politics as usual.360 To the extent that Citizens United and its ilk are justiﬁed on Carolene grounds, then, the defense fails. These cases are
mistaken, not correct, Carolene decisions that err in their arguments
about how restrictions on electoral funding affect democratic values.
This error, though, is an interesting one. It highlights the hazards
of commenting on policies’ democratic implications in the absence
of empirical evidence. Both the Roberts Court and the academics
have reasonable intuitions about how campaign ﬁnance regulations
shape the electoral landscape. But these intuitions are aired without
facts to back them up—and it turns out the facts don’t back them
up. Carolene-style analysis thus shouldn’t proceed on the basis of
logic, precedent, or conventional wisdom. To be done right, it should
focus relentlessly on how the data say that policies and democratic
values are related. Sometimes the data correspond to observers’

355
Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. the Controversy, 30 Const
Comm 463, 482 (2015).
356

Balkin, 92 BU L Rev at 1160 (cited in note 167).
Id; see also, for example, Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment
and Public Law, 125 Yale L J 400, 461 (2015) (“Campaign ﬁnance regulations might well
beneﬁt incumbents at the expense of challengers. . . .”); Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of
the Devices of Democracy, 94 Colum L Rev 1326, 1339 (1994) (“[U]nder the line of argument
in Carolene Products . . . campaign ﬁnance is subsumed under a larger topic in which constant
judicial vigilance and consequent judicial jurisdiction are appropriate.”).
357

358
359

See notes 340–43 and accompanying text.
See id.

360
To take the two most prominent federal examples, the Federal Election Campaign Act
was passed in 1974, in the wake of Watergate, and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
became law in 2002, after the Enron scandal.
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expectations. But sometimes they don’t, and in that scenario, heeding
the empirics is the only way to avoid Carolene decisions that are simultaneously mistaken and perverse.
3. Voting Rights Act. Lastly, I want to say a word about the Voting
Rights Act (VRA): a topic I have studiously avoided until now.361
Most VRA litigation involves racial vote dilution: the reduction of minority voters’ electoral inﬂuence through mechanisms like at-large
elections and cleverly drawn districts.362 Racial vote dilution is best
understood as a ground for judicial intervention under Carolene’s third
prong.363 It’s only possible when voting is racially polarized, that is,
when minority and nonminority voters have different political preferences.364 Racial polarization, in turn, is “a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”365 Without racial
polarization, in other words, minorities and nonminorities alike do
well enough in the rough-and-tumble of pluralist politics, and Carolene’s third prong counsels judicial restraint.
Racial vote dilution, then, is beyond this article’s scope because it
involves Carolene’s third prong rather than its second. But the VRA
also prohibits racial vote denial: measures making it more difﬁcult for
minority members to vote.366 Unlike racial vote dilution, racial vote
denial ﬁts naturally under Carolene’s second prong. It hinders political
participation: the least controversial democratic value underpinning

361
I have also studiously avoided discussing the Court’s racial gerrymandering precedents.
These cases are based on the excessive consideration of race in the redistricting process: a
factor unrelated to Carolene’s concerns about the abridgment of democratic values. In other
words, the racial gerrymandering cases aren’t an exercise of pro-democratic judicial review
and so are unrelated to my project here.
362
See, for example, Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013
Supreme Court Review 55, 73–74 (“While the VRA prohibits both vote dilution and vote
denial, the former has accounted for the vast majority of activity under both Section 2 and
Section 5.”).
363
For another scholar agreeing with this framing, see Karlan, 114 Yale L J at 1336 (cited
in note 103) (“[T]he analysis of racial vote dilution came essentially to unpack Carolene
Products’s antidiscrimination rationale for judicial intervention . . .”).
364
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 Stan L Rev 1323, 1338
(2016) (“Conceptually, there can be vote dilution only if there is racial polarization in
voting.”).
365

United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).

366

For a full-length article on the VRA’s treatment of racial vote denial, see Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Uniﬁed Law, 128 Yale L J 1566 (2019).
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this part of Carolene.367 It can also lead to countermajoritarian outcomes if disenfranchised minority members would have changed
election results had they been able to vote. Racial vote denial can
undermine responsiveness, too, by allowing politicians to neglect the
views of their minority constituents.368
I doubt I have to belabor how the categories of Carolene decisions
would apply here. A correct Carolene decision would strike down a
law making it harder for minority members to vote. A reverse Carolene decision would uphold it. And a perverse Carolene decision
would prevent a nonjudicial actor—like Congress—from trying to
stop racial vote denial—as through the VRA. Of course, the Roberts
Court did exactly that in its 2013 ruling in Shelby County v Holder.369
For almost half a century, Section 5 of the VRA had barred certain
jurisdictions, mostly in the South, from amending their election laws
unless they ﬁrst showed that their revisions wouldn’t worsen the
electoral position of minority voters.370 The Shelby County Court held
that the formula for determining Section 5 coverage exceeded Congress’s enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments.371
The Court thus nulliﬁed the most important provision ever passed to
combat racial vote denial (and racial vote dilution).372
The Court’s reasoning was as perverse, in Carolene terms, as its
ruling. The Court conceded that racial discrimination in voting is
undemocratic. It’s “an insidious and pervasive evil” when “state and
local governments work[] tirelessly to disenfranchise citizens on the
basis of race.”373 The Court also noted that Congress concluded that
racial discrimination in voting continued to be common when it
renewed Section 5. “Congress compiled thousands of pages of evidence before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act,” emphasizing, in

367

See Part I.

368

For another scholar concurring that racial vote denial offends Carolene’s second and
third prongs, see Ortiz, 77 Va L Rev at 728 n 5 (cited in note 166) (“Paragraph two’s and
paragraph three’s theories do overlap to some extent. Laws disenfranchising blacks, for example, both impose a formal blockage and reﬂect prejudice.”).
369
570 US 529 (2013).
370

See id at 537–39.

371

See id at 542–57.
See id at 562 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) (describing Section 5 as “one of the most consequential, efﬁcacious, and amply justiﬁed exercises of federal legislative power in our Nation’s history”).
372

373

Id at 535, 552 (quotation marks omitted).
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particular, “‘second-generation barriers,’ which are . . . electoral arrangements that affect the weight of minority votes.”374
But the Court then substituted its own judgment for Congress’s.
According to the Court, racial discrimination in voting is less widespread than in earlier eras, so Section 5 is an excessive response to a
waning problem. “[T]hings have changed in the South,” the Court
opined.375 “Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are
rare.”376 “Voter registration and turnout numbers in the covered
States have risen dramatically.”377 “[H]istory did not end in 1965,”
with Section 5’s original enactment, and “that [modern] history cannot be ignored.”378 Maybe the Court’s view is correct or maybe it’s
mistaken.379 What’s undeniable, though, is that it’s the Court’s view
of racial discrimination in voting, which diverges sharply from Congress’s position on the subject. Shelby County thus introduced a novel
rationale for a perverse Carolene decision. For the ﬁrst time, the Roberts Court blocked a nonjudicial actor from curbing undemocratic
practices based on the Court’s unshared opinion that these practices
no longer warranted legislative action.
IV. Carolene Alternatives
a. apolitical accounts
The Roberts Court, then, richly deserves its moniker as the antiCarolene Court. Its decision in Rucho is the purest reverse Carolene
ruling in memory, openly admitting that partisan gerrymandering is
undemocratic but refusing to do anything about it. Rucho may soon be
followed by perverse Carolene decisions invalidating redistricting
commissions—the main nonjudicial option for thwarting gerrymandering—on any of several bases. And in other areas, perverse Carolene
results have already arrived. The Roberts Court’s campaign ﬁnance
374
Id at 553; see also, for example, id at 559 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) (“Congress determined, based on a voluminous record, that the scourge of discrimination was not yet
extirpated.”).
375
Id at 540 (quotation marks omitted); see also id at 547 (“Nearly 50 years later, things
have changed dramatically.”).
376
377
378

Id at 540 (quotation marks omitted).
Id at 550.
Id at 532.

379

Justice Ginsburg’s dissent makes a powerful case that it’s mistaken. See id at 570–80
(summarizing the congressional record of continued racial discrimination in voting).
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cases are classics of the genre, preventing federal and state authorities
from addressing the harms of money in politics. Shelby County is
another perverse Carolene masterpiece, announcing that Congress
isn’t free to check the undemocratic activity, racial discrimination in
voting, that motivated both the Fifteenth Amendment and the VRA.
But the Roberts Court can’t just oppose Carolene; it must also favor
some other theory of judicial decision making.380 What might this
alternative theory be? If not the promotion of democracy, that is,
what other approach might explain the Roberts Court’s rulings in
cases implicating Carolene’s second prong? One possibility, supported
by language in Rucho itself, is a commitment to judicial restraint.
Perhaps the Roberts Court seeks to avoid the “expansion of judicial
power,” especially into “intensely partisan aspects of American political life.”381 That way, perhaps the Court hopes to stop “the unelected and politically unaccountable branch of the Federal Government” from “assuming such an extraordinary and unprecedented
role.”382
Judicial restraint could indeed account for the Roberts Court’s
reverse Carolene decisions: rulings like Rucho, declining to strike down a
partisan gerrymander, and Crawford v Marion County Elections Board,
upholding a photo ID requirement for voting.383 A Carolene Court
would have intervened in these cases in order to vindicate democratic
values. But a Court that prioritized the passive virtues could have
justiﬁed its inaction on the ground that judges shouldn’t nullify duly
enacted laws in all but the most exceptional circumstances.384
Judicial restraint, however, can’t possibly explain the Roberts
Court’s perverse Carolene decisions. In its campaign ﬁnance cases and
in Shelby County, the Court didn’t avoid the “expansion of judicial
power” into “intensely partisan aspects of American political life.”385
The Court didn’t practice the passive virtues. Instead it skeptically
evaluated, and then invalidated, regulation after regulation of electoral funding as well as the crown jewel of the VRA. There’s plainly
380
I suppose it’s possible, too, for the Court’s rulings in this area to be ad hoc, unsystematic, and so irreconcilable by any single theory.
381
Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2507 (2019).
382
383

Id.
553 US 181 (2008).

384
See generally Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv L Rev 40
(1961).
385

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2507.
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nothing restrained about these rulings. Nor would there be about the
perverse Carolene decisions that may lie ahead: the elimination of
redistricting commissions, the rejection of congressional efforts to
facilitate access to the franchise, the conclusion that automatic voter
registration violates the First Amendment, and so on. If they come
about, these rulings would amount to unabashed judicial activism—
“an extraordinary and unprecedented role” for “the unelected and
politically unaccountable branch,” in the Rucho majority’s words.386
If not judicial restraint, then what about federalism? The claim that
states should enjoy wide leeway in administering elections also appeared in Rucho. “The opportunity to control the drawing of electoral
boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment,” commented the majority, “is a critical and traditional part of politics in
the United States.”387 Like judicial restraint, too, federalism may account for the Roberts Court’s reverse Carolene decisions. When the
Court sustains state laws like partisan gerrymanders or photo ID
requirements for voting, it prevents state choices about electoral
processes from being disrupted by a federal authority. And unlike
judicial restraint, federalism may justify some of the Roberts Court’s
perverse Carolene rulings as well. A number of these cases have involved (or could soon involve) federal regulations of redistricting, the
right to vote, campaign ﬁnance, and racial discrimination in voting.
When the Court strikes down these regulations, it arguably creates
space for states to manage their own elections, unimpeded by congressional mandates and proscriptions.388
Federalism, though, can’t explain Chief Justice Roberts’s Arizona
State Legislature dissent. Arizona’s own electorate (not any federal
body) decided to establish an independent redistricting commission.
Yet Chief Justice Roberts would have undone this state choice on the
basis of federal constitutional law. Nor is federalism a theme of the
Roberts Court’s campaign ﬁnance cases. These cases have never distinguished between state and federal restrictions of electoral funding.
In fact, several of the cases have nulliﬁed state policies like Vermont’s
386

Id.

387

Id at 2498 (quotation marks omitted).

388

Only arguably, because states may take advantage of this Court-created space to hinder
participation, suppress competition, and otherwise undermine democratic values. The fear
that states may act in these undemocratic ways, of course, is precisely why Carolene advocates
judicial intervention and why Congress sometimes feels the need to constrain states’ electoral
decision making.
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contribution limits389 and Arizona’s system of public ﬁnancing.390 And
nor is federalism the impetus for the looming First Amendment attacks on redistricting commissions and automatic voter registration.
These attacks pack exactly the same punch whether the measures are
enacted by the federal government or by states.
The conventional modalities I alluded to earlier—in particular,
the Constitution’s text and history—are another possible driver of the
Roberts Court’s election law decisions.391 Notably, the Rucho majority did analyze the language of the Elections Clause, the congressional regulations of redistricting passed pursuant to that provision, and the long and sordid history of gerrymandering.392 But this
analysis was just one of numerous reasons (I counted ﬁve in total393)
that the Rucho majority gave for its ruling. The majority’s other reasons had nothing to do with constitutional text or history. More
importantly, the only argument of North Carolina’s that failed to
persuade the majority was the state’s originalist claim. The state
contended that, “through the Elections Clause, the Framers set aside
electoral issues such as [partisan gerrymandering] as questions that
only Congress can resolve.”394 But the majority “d[id] not agree”
because prior “cases have held that there is a role for the courts with
respect to at least some issues that could arise from a State’s drawing
of congressional districts.”395
The Constitution’s text and history were also dogs that didn’t bark
in the Roberts Court’s other key anti-Carolene decisions. In Crawford,
the plurality neither quoted nor said anything about the ratiﬁcation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments: the provisions that Indiana’s
photo ID requirement for voting was alleged to violate.396 In Citizens
United, the majority was almost as taciturn, citing the First Amendment’s text only in passing397 and responding in just one paragraph

389

See Randall v Sorrell, 548 US 230 (2006) (plurality).

390

See Ariz. Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v Bennett, 564 US 721 (2011).

391

See notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
See id; see also Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2494–96.

392
393

See Part II.B.

394

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2495.
Id at 2495–96.

395
396

See Crawford v Marion County Elections Bd., 553 US 181, 185–204 (2008) (plurality).

397

See Citizens United v FEC, 558 US 310, 336 (2010).
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(out of sixty-two pages in the United States Reports) to “the view that
the First Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the
suppression of [corporate] speech.”398 This view, in contrast, was
developed in great detail by Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent.399
And in Shelby County, it was again the dissent that was more rigorously
originalist than the majority. The majority stressed a free-ﬂoating
“principle of equal sovereignty”400 as well as its idiosyncratic view that
racial discrimination in voting is no longer a serious problem.401 On
the other hand, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg “ﬁrmly rooted” her
dissent in the “constitutional text” and described the rationales of
“the [Fifteenth] Amendment’s framers” in “choosing this language.”402
Of course, constitutional text and history aren’t the only conventional modalities; reasoning based on the Court’s precedents is another.403 But respect for the Court’s past rulings fares even worse as
an explanation for the Roberts Court’s election law oeuvre. Rucho
itself reversed the Court’s earlier holding, in the 1986 case of Davis v
Bandemer,404 that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable. In
so doing, the Rucho majority liberally quoted Justice O’Connor’s
Bandemer dissent405 while virtually ignoring the plurality opinion
that controlled the case’s outcome.406 Elsewhere in the redistricting
arena, Chief Justice Roberts’s Arizona State Legislature dissent would
have abrogated a series of early-twentieth-century cases. According
to those cases, “the Legislature” empowered by the Elections Clause
to regulate congressional elections includes not just “the representative body which makes the laws of the people”407—as Chief Justice

398
399

Id at 353.
See id at 425–32 (Stevens, J, dissenting).

400

Shelby County v Holder, 570 US 529, 534, 540, 542, 544, 556 (2013).

401

See Part III.B.3.
Shelby County, 570 US at 567 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).

402
403

See generally Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 877 (cited in note 184).

404

478 US 109 (1986); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399, 414
(2006) (noting that, while “[a] plurality of the Court in Vieth [v Jubelirer, 541 US 267 (2004)]
would have held [partisan gerrymandering] challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions,” “a majority declined to do so”).
405
See Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2501, 2503 (2019).
406

See id at 2497, 2500.

407

Ariz. State Leg. v Ariz. Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S Ct 2652, 2679 (2015)
(Roberts, CJ, dissenting).
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Roberts maintained—but also a popular referendum408 and a gubernatorial veto.409
The Roberts Court has equally spurned stare decisis outside the
redistricting context. In Citizens United, the Court reversed two prior
decisions (one just seven years old at the time) that had upheld bans
on corporate spending in elections.410 In the 2014 case of McCutcheon
v FEC, the Court abandoned its earlier position that aggregate contribution limits are constitutional.411 And in Shelby County, the Court
turned its back on four previous holdings that Section 5 of the VRA
was a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments.412 Until then, as Justice Ginsburg observed in her dissent, the Court had always “accorded Congress the
full measure of respect its judgments in this domain should garner.”413
A last account of the Roberts Court’s election law jurisprudence
might be libertarian. Maybe the Court strives to protect individual
freedoms from governmental actions that threaten to abridge them.
The Court’s campaign ﬁnance cases certainly sound in this key.
“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress
it, whether by design or inadvertence,” declared the majority in
Citizens United.414 “The First Amendment conﬁrms the freedom to
think for ourselves.”415 The other First Amendment claims discussed
above—against redistricting commissions and automatic voter registration416—could also be justiﬁed on libertarian grounds. The claims’
proponents would surely argue that they’re defending people’s rights
to serve in government regardless of their political views and to
choose for themselves whether to participate in the political process.

408
409

See Davis v Hildebrant, 241 US 565 (1916).
See Smiley v Holm, 285 US 355 (1932).

410
These prior decisions were Austin v Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652 (1990), and
part of McConnell v FEC, 540 US 93 (2003).
411
See 572 US 185, 200 (2014) (plurality) (“[W]e think [Buckley v Valeo’s] ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not
control here.”).
412
These previous holdings were South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301 (1966), Georgia v
United States, 411 US 526 (1973), Rome v United States, 446 US 156 (1980), and Lopez v
Monterey County, 525 US 266 (1999).
413
414

Shelby County v Holder, 570 US 529, 568 (2013) (Ginsburg, dissenting).
Citizens United v FEC, 558 US 310, 340 (2010).

415

Id at 356.

416

See Parts III.A.3, III.B.1.
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Rucho, however, involved a First Amendment challenge, too.417
Witness testimony and academic evidence established that partisan
gerrymanders deter voters from going to the polls, candidates from
running for ofﬁce, and donors from giving money.418 These are
burdens on speech and association at least as heavy as those imposed
by campaign ﬁnance regulations, let alone redistricting commissions
or automatic voter registration. Yet the majority thought the First
Amendment couldn’t supply “a serious standard for separating constitutional from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.”419 Speech
and association also aren’t the only rights protected by the Constitution. “The precious right to vote,” as Justice Ginsburg called it at
a recent oral argument, is jealously guarded as well.420 Yet as noted
earlier, the Roberts Court has never found that a law impermissibly
interferes with citizens’ exercise of the franchise.421 For any libertarian theory of the Court’s doctrine, this is embarrassing. A libertarian Court, after all, would champion all constitutional freedoms. It
wouldn’t pick and choose among them.
b. political accounts
None of the usual models of judicial decision making, then, can
render coherent the Roberts Court’s record in cases implicating
Carolene’s second prong. Judicial restraint, federalism, constitutional
text and history, precedent, and individual freedom—all these approaches have been the exception as often as the rule. But maybe
we’re looking in the wrong place for a unifying principle. The subject
of Carolene’s second prong is the well-being of American democracy:
the performance of “those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”422 So
maybe we should be trying to come up with an explanation whose
thrust is the Roberts Court’s opinion of how American democracy is
functioning.
417
418
419

See Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484, 2504–05 (2019).
See notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2504.

Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill v Whitford, No 16-1161, ∗24 (Oct 3, 2017); see also,
for example, Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 562 (1964) (“[A]ny alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”).
420

421

See note 318 and accompanying text.

422

United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).
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Proceeding sympathetically, a perspective could be imagined that
would unify the Roberts Court’s election law decisions. On this
view, American democracy generally works well enough when voters,
campaign funders, and state electoral regulators are left to their own
devices. At least in the modern era, state regulators rarely engage in
the blatantly undemocratic activities—the suppression of large swaths
of the electorate, particularly on racial grounds, and extreme malapportionment—that necessitated judicial intervention in earlier periods. But, this postulated view goes on, today’s electoral regulators
(especially at the federal level) still pose their own threats to a vibrant
democratic order. The most common of these is the constriction of
electoral funding, which beneﬁts incumbents, stiﬂes competition, and
distorts the public debate. Another danger is heavy-handed legislation
on behalf of minority groups, which balkanizes society on racial lines
and isn’t warranted by current conditions. Further, emerging concerns include independent redistricting commissions, the federalization of election administration, and automatic voter registration, all of
which would upend a system that’s far from broken. The Court must
continue to protect American democracy from these pitfalls.423
While it’s possible to articulate this view, though, it’s not as easy to
defend it. To begin with, if the Roberts Court thinks that partisan
gerrymandering, voter suppression, and racial discrimination in voting no longer imperil American democracy, the Court is wrong.
Gerrymandering has been more severe in the current cycle—giving
rise to district maps more biased in the line-drawing party’s favor—
than at any point in at least half a century.424 This decade has also seen
the passage of more laws making it harder to vote than any period
since the civil rights era.425 And the phenomenon that makes racial
vote denial and racial vote dilution appealing to certain politicians,
racial polarization in voting, has rebounded in recent years to the
highest levels in modern times.426 The Roberts Court may well be
unaware of these facts. But even if so, the Court’s lack of information

423
For a similar effort to understand the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence, albeit in the equal
protection rather than the electoral context, see Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed
Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 Cal L Rev 1565
(2013).
424
See Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 82 U Chi L Rev at 871–73 (cited in note 182).
425

See note 313 and accompanying text.

426

See Stephanopoulos, 68 Stan L Rev at 1354–58 (cited in note 364).
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doesn’t justify its reverse Carolene decisions. It makes them a series
of Carolene mistakes.
The Roberts Court’s perverse Carolene decisions, to date, rest on
similar empirical misconceptions. As pointed out above, it simply
isn’t the case that most campaign ﬁnance limits help incumbents and
throttle competition.427 To the contrary, they typically have the opposite effects because they erode the fundraising edge that ofﬁceholders enjoy in the absence of regulation. The democratic case for
invalidating minority voting rights legislation like the VRA is doubly
ﬂawed, too. Not only does persistent racial polarization in voting
indicate the continuing need for such laws.428 The VRA’s signature
remedy—the creation of districts where minority voters are able to
elect their preferred candidates—also doesn’t inﬂuence minority or
nonminority voters’ racial attitudes.429 These districts thus improve
minority representation without fomenting racial strife.
And as for the perverse Carolene rulings just over the horizon,
they’re usually urged despite their democratic implications, not because of them. Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s Arizona State Legislature dissent. He never argued that Arizona’s political system would
function better without an independent redistricting commission.430
His position, instead, was that democratic impact is irrelevant. “For
better or worse, the Elections Clause of the Constitution does not
allow [Arizonans] to address those concerns [about gerrymandering]
by displacing their legislature.”431 Likewise, the other claims against
redistricting commissions, as well as the objections to federalizing
election administration and automatically registering voters, have no
democratic basis. Their common stance is that the Constitution requires certain outcomes—and that, if democracy suffers as a result,
well, that’s the price of following the law.
If a sympathetic account of the Roberts Court’s beliefs about
American politics is unpersuasive, would a more cynical explanation

427
428

See notes 336–43 and accompanying text.
See note 426 and accompanying text.

429
See Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily, Testing Shaw v. Reno: Do MajorityMinority Districts Cause Expressive Harms?, 90 NYU L Rev 1041 (2015).
430
Though he did complain about the commission’s supposed partisanship. See Ariz. State
Leg. v Ariz. Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S Ct 2652, 2691–92 (2015) (Roberts, CJ,
dissenting).
431

Id at 2692.
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gain more traction? This thesis would go roughly as follows: Running
like a red thread through the Roberts Court’s anti-Carolene decisions
is perceived, and actual, partisan advantage. Both when the Court
intervenes and when it stays on the sidelines, its actions are consistent
with the recommendations of conservative elites. Both the Court’s
intrusions into, and its abstentions from, the political process also
empirically beneﬁt the Republican Party, whose presidents appointed a majority of the sitting Justices.432
The amicus lineup in Rucho supports this legal realist thesis. Here’s
a list of every organization that ﬁled an amicus brief on behalf of
North Carolina: the Republican National Committee, the National
Republican Congressional Committee, the National Republican Redistricting Trust, North Carolina’s Republican members of Congress,
the Republican-run Wisconsin State Legislature, ten other states with
uniﬁed Republican governments, the Allied Educational Foundation,
the American Civil Rights Union, Judicial Watch, the Public Interest
Legal Foundation, and the Southeastern Legal Foundation.433 Each
of these entities is either (1) a Republican Party committee; (2) a
Republican-run legislature or state government; or (3) a right-wing
think tank. And each of these entities—and no other entities—advocated the nonjusticiability of partisan gerrymandering claims.
The story was much the same in the Roberts Court’s other major
anti-Carolene cases. In Crawford, the Republican National Committee, Senator Mitch McConnell and other Republican members of
Congress, nine Republican-run states, and an array of conservative
foundations advised the Court to uphold Indiana’s photo ID requirement for voting.434 In Citizens United, the amici arguing that the
federal ban on corporate and union spending in elections should be
struck down included Senator McConnell, the Chamber of Commerce,

432
For a similar view of the Roberts Court by a pair of activists writing about the Court’s
entire docket, see Aaron Belkin and Sean McElwee, Don’t Be Fooled. Chief Justice John Roberts
Is as Partisan as They Come, NY Times (Oct 7, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/23GR
-ZNLB. For a similar view by a pair of academics writing about the right to vote, see Lisa
Marshall Manheim and Elizabeth G. Porter, The Elephant in the Room: Intentional Voter
Suppression, 2019 Supreme Court Review 213.
433
See Docket, Rucho v Common Cause, Supreme Court of the United States, https://www
.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?ﬁlenamep/docket/docketﬁles/html/public/18-422.html (last
visited Oct 1, 2019).
434
See Docket, Crawford v Marion County Elections Bd., Supreme Court of the United
States, https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?ﬁlenamep/docket/docketﬁles/07-21.htm
(last visited Oct 1, 2019).
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the National Riﬂe Association, and many right-wing think tanks.435
And in Shelby County, seven Republican-run states (across three separate briefs), eight former Republican Department of Justice ofﬁcials,
and the usual constellation of conservative groups asked the Court to
nullify Section 5 of the VRA.436 In none of these cases could the Justices
have had much doubt about the wishes of elite Republican and rightwing actors. Their views, expressed at length in their amicus briefs,
were plain as day.
Nor were these actors mistaken about the partisan consequences of
their positions. Academic evidence conﬁrms that their stands electorally beneﬁt Republicans. Gerrymandering, ﬁrst, has no necessary
partisan valence. Either party can craft an advantageous map when it
has the opportunity to draw the lines. In the current cycle, though,
Republicans had many more such chances than Democrats. The
well-timed wave election of 2010 gave them uniﬁed control of most
states (including almost all swing states) right before the country’s
districts were due to be reconﬁgured. As a result, eight of this decade’s
ten most biased congressional plans were skewed in a Republican
direction.437 So were nine of this decade’s ten most tilted state house
maps.438 Across all district plans nationwide, the median map was
more pro-Republican than at any earlier time.439
Second, the partisan effects of photo ID requirements for voting
are often overstated, but the measures do seem to shift the vote by up
to a percentage point in Republicans’ favor.440 Democratic-leaning
constituencies like minorities and the poor are less likely to possess
valid IDs than whiter, wealthier Republican voters. Third, unlimited
electoral spending by outside actors usually boosts Republicans because pro-Republican expenditures tend to exceed those backing

435
See Docket, Citizens United v FEC, Supreme Court of the United States, https://www
.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?ﬁlenamep/docket/docketﬁles/08-205.htm (last visited Oct 1,
2019).
436
See Docket, Shelby County v Holder, Supreme Court of the United States, https://www
.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?ﬁlenamep/docket/docketﬁles/12-96.htm (last visited Oct 1,
2019).
437

These data are on ﬁle with the author and cover the 2012, 2014, and 2016 elections.

These data also are on ﬁle with the author and apply to the 2012–16 period.
See Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 82 U Chi L Rev at 873 (cited in note 182) (analyzing
elections up to 2012). Post-2012 data on ﬁle with the author conﬁrm these trends.
438
439

440
See, for example, Stephanopoulos, 114 Colum L Rev at 328 (cited in note 55) (surveying
the relevant academic literature).
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Democrats. So after Citizens United removed the shackles on electioneering by corporations, unions, and other outside groups, Republican seat and vote shares surged in state legislatures.441 And
fourth, Section 5 of the VRA used to block covered jurisdictions
(mostly Republican-run in recent years) from making it harder for
minority voters (a heavily Democratic group) to cast ballots and earn
representation. But since Shelby County, these jurisdictions have
adopted scores of new voting restrictions, and in the next redistricting
cycle, they will probably dismantle many districts that previously
elected minority Democrats to ofﬁce.442
To be clear, I have no interest in psychoanalyzing the Justices.443
I don’t know (or think it’s critical) what subjectively motivates their
rulings. So my argument here isn’t that Chief Justice Roberts, or
the Justices who typically vote with him in election law cases, are
trying to assist Republicans. Instead, my claims are that the Roberts
Court consistently decides these cases in the ways preferred by conservative elites; and that its resulting decisions do, in fact, consistently
aid Republicans. Moreover, partisan advantage is a more reliable explanation than any other factor. Whether or not it consciously drives
any Justice’s behavior, it better accounts for the Roberts Court’s
election law rulings than any alternative hypothesis.
If these claims are correct, they provide a coda for the Roberts
Court’s anti-Carolene record. The Court often issues reverse Carolene
decisions, declining to intervene when American democracy is endangered. (Rucho is the most recent example.) The Court also commonly hands down perverse Carolene decisions, preventing nonjudicial actors from curbing democratic abuses. (Citizens United and
Shelby County are the archetypes here.) And the most convincing
reason for this anti-Carolene activity is perceived, and actual, partisan
gain. By holding its ﬁre when Carolene says to shoot, and by stepping
441
See, for example, Nour Abdul-Razzak et al, After Citizens United: How Outside Spending
Shapes American Democracy 24–25 (Mar 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/7LX9-ZNTE.
442
See, for example, Stephanopoulos, 2013 Supreme Court Review at 102–06 (cited in
note 362).
443
My reservations about attributing motives to the Justices (or anybody else) are why I
have relegated this section to the end of the article. The article’s core claim is that the Roberts Court is the anti-Carolene Court—not that partisanship is an explanation for the Roberts Court’s anti-Carolene record (though I think it is). Even here, as the prior sentence
makes clear, I only argue that partisanship is an (not the) explanation for the Roberts Court’s
record. I’m sure the other aspects of judicial decision making I have discussed play some role,
too.
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in when Carolene advises stepping back, the Court improves Republican electoral prospects at every turn.
If the claims are correct, they corroborate the objection to political
process theory recently leveled by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
too.444 Process theory, Posner and Vermeule point out, requires
judges not to succumb to the partisan and political pressures that
inﬂuence legislative and executive ofﬁcials.445 Only if judges are
insensitive to these forces can they protect “those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation”446 (Carolene’s formulation) or stop “the ins [from] choking
off the channels of political change”447 (Ely’s). But, Posner and Vermeule continue, this requirement is frequently unrealistic. “Because
the executive and legislative [branches] jointly control the process of
judicial appointments,” the same group that dominates those branches
may “ﬁlter out judges who would challenge [its] prejudices and ﬁlter
in judges who share them.”448 That group may thus “structure judicial
behavior so as to perpetuate [its] own power.”449
Posner and Vermeule’s model of judges as “inside the system”—
not platonically outside it—seems to ﬁt the Roberts Court. The
members of its conservative majority have the same educations, afﬁliations, and qualiﬁcations as nonjudicial right-wing elites in the
executive and legislative branches. These members were also selected
for their positions precisely because of these backgrounds. So they
may have no incentive to ﬁx malfunctions in Carolene’s “political
processes” that accrue to their copartisans’ beneﬁt. Why would they
want to correct such useful ﬂaws? They may also be disinclined, in
Ely’s terms, to block “the ins” from rigging the electoral system
against “the outs.” Again, why should they, when they’re as much the
ins as the politicians doing the rigging? And they may be keen to
obstruct efforts by nonjudicial actors that threaten to advantage the
outs. Once more, avoiding that edge for the outs takes priority over
ameliorating American democracy.
444
See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U Chi L Rev
1743, 1763–66 (2013).
445

See id.

446

United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).
Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 103 (cited in note 3).

447
448

Posner and Vermeule, 80 U Chi L Rev at 1765 (cited in note 444).

449

Id.
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V. Conclusion
It’s an irony of history that the same lawyer, Emmet Bondurant, argued both Wesberry, the 1964 case that announced the oneperson, one-vote rule for congressional districts, and Rucho, which
held that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.450 Bondurant made essentially the same point on both occasions. Malapportionment, he told the Wesberry Court as a twenty-six-year-old
attorney just out of law school, is undemocratic because it allows a
minority to entrench itself in power by cramming opposing voters into overpopulated districts.451 Gerrymandering, he similarly explained to the Rucho Court as an eighty-two-year-old law ﬁrm partner with decades of legal experience, undermines democratic values
in several ways. It, too, enables a minority to seize undeserved power,
by cracking and packing the other side’s voters so their ballots
translate into fewer seats. Gerrymandering further stiﬂes competition, by making most districts safe, and chills participation, by rendering futile voters’ electoral efforts.452
But while Bondurant advanced the same arguments in Wesberry
and Rucho, the cases’ outcomes, of course, diverged. In Wesberry, the
Court turned the political world upside down, declaring a principle of
population equality that doomed most of the country’s congressional
districts and ended one of the most undemocratic features of midcentury America. In Rucho, in contrast, the Court slammed the door
on partisan gerrymandering claims and thus permitted one of the
most invidious practices in modern American politics to persist and
even intensify. Why the difference? In a word, Carolene. The Wesberry Court was a true Carolene Court, committed to exercising (and
refraining from exercising) judicial authority to serve democratic ends.
The Roberts Court, on the other hand, is the anti-Carolene Court. It
has a near-perfect record of doing nothing when it should have done
something, doing all too much when it should have sat still, and promoting the same party’s interests through all its maneuvers. Rucho is
just the latest, saddest entry in this ledger of democratic frustration.

450
For a nice story on this historical twist, see Johnny Kauffman, 55 Years Later, Lawyer
Will Again Argue Over Redistricting Before Supreme Court, NPR (Mar 24, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/SH7U-T4QD.
451

See Transcript of Oral Argument, Wesberry v Sanders, No 22 (Nov 18, 1964).

452

See Transcript of Oral Argument, Rucho v Common Cause, No 18-422 (Mar 26, 2019).
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